Subject: STOP CASSINI NEWSLETTER #74 -- September 29th, 1998
Sent to: Subscriber List, press, elected officials. May be redistributed and reprinted if done responsibly.
DoD does something about DU. Send J.C. into space! Do all these rocket failures appall me, and should they? Also, written answers to Japanese Television Interview with the editor of this newsletter.
Sincerely, Russell D. Hoffman, Editor, STOP CASSINI NEWSLETTER
By Russell D. Hoffman
Copyright (c) Russell D. Hoffman
***** STOP CASSINI NEWSLETTER Volume #74, September 29th, 1998 *****
****** VOLUME #74, September 29th, 1998 ******
*** U.S. DoD "solves" a burning problem regarding its use of Depleted Uranium
The San Francisco Examiner is reporting that the next GI Common Tasks Training (CTT) manual will include information about the hazards of Depleted Uranium (DU). DU is a radiological hazard to five distinct groups of people:
1) Those involved in the manufacture and testing of DU weapons.
2) Those who handle DU weapons to get them to the battlefield and to use them.
3) Those who are near it when it impacts its target (or anywhere else)
4) Those who handle vehicles and other objects that have been hit by DU weaponry
5) Those who happen to absorb some of the DU into their bodies as it spreads around the globe following the cessation of whatever conflict it was used it.
Of these groups, it is likely that the manual only covers groups 2 and 4. It will undoubtedly NOT discuss the fact that use of weapons with such long-term ecological consequences is insane. It will NOT discuss that the approximately 10 million rounds fired during the Gulf War (when it was first used in combat) left a radiological legacy that will cause increased cancer rates worldwide (but especially in Kuwait and Iraq). Admittedly, the worldwide increase will be undetectable by statistical sampling methods commonly employed today, but it will still happen, nevertheless. Even when the victim -- who may never even have heard of the "Gulf War" -- screams in agony "Take me Lord" (as cancer patients sometimes scream, when the pain becomes unbearable) it will be a silent killer. No one will blame a long-forgotten and senseless war.
In fact, though, just as poison gas, land mines and other horrors have been outlawed by convention due to the barbaric nature of those weapons, so too should DU be banned completely. Instead its use since the Gulf War has increased tremendously and many nations now employ this sadistic and inhumane weapon. We continue to call for a ban on all DU weapons, DU armor, and on its use in commercial airliners like the Boeing 747 (where over a ton of the stuff is used as counterweights in the tail and control surfaces).
A much more complete report on DU appears in issue #51 of this newsletter, which is available at this URL:
*** I believe it's time for her to fly: Send Jerrie Cobb into space at last!
NASA is all publicity and no heart. In 1959 NASA recruited a few good woman to develop a female astronaut program. They released the "would-be" heros before letting any of them fly, of course, and the rest would be history, except one of them -- Jerrie Cobb -- is applying to NASA to be reinstated. According to The Boston Globe, she even met with madman Dan Goldin just last week, but to no avail. It's hard to argue with a madman, Jerrie!
There is a petition going to get her into space, supported by the National Organization for Woman, the American Association of University Woman and many other groups. Let's all add all our names to the list! Send your letters directly to President Clinton, Dan Goldin, or care of this editor and I'll forward them to someone. The Minnesota Women's Press has a web page with more information. Here is the URL of that page:
According to the Boston Globe report Cobb stated, "I don't think we can learn anything from sending any one person up." She added, "And face it, most older people are woman anyway. It would make better sense and better science to send a woman up." Cobb had been spending her life flying seeds, medicine and supplies into the Amazon jungle for indigenous tribes located there. It sounds a lot more useful than being a U.S. Senator, that's for sure! Cobb is 67. Glenn is 77.
*** From the mailbag: Am I amazed at the number of rocket failures that occur?
FROM THE MAILBAG (CLIP):
At 06:40 PM 9/16/98 "K" wrote:
You seemed to be appalled at the failure rate of rockets. As an engineer, I'm actually amazed they don't fail more often. Launch vehicles operate on the edge of material science and technology. They are extremely complex machines which expend more energy per pound than anything else (short of explosives). You just can't expect the kind of reliability you get from a 747 or a Toyota. I'm sure the Delta III systems had been tested extensively on the ground, yet something failed during the maiden launch. Unfortunate, but not unprecedented. ESA's Ariane 5 also exploded on its maiden flight last year when a software bug crashed its guidance computer. The Delta series has been very reliable in the past as launch vehicles go, but if a brand of car failed as often nobody would buy one. I think the news media gives these failures (unmanned missions) low coverage because they just aren't major events. There are many dozens of launches world-wide every year now, so the occasional failure just doesn't get much attention.
END OF CLIP
MY RESPONSE (CLIP):
I must correct something, which is your statement that "You seemed to be appalled at the failure rate of rockets". I'm glad you brought that up. It's actually not true. I understand that there will be failures, and I expect failures in the rocket program. I'm not appalled by that at all, nor am I surprised by it, nor am I demanding perfection to be satisfied. It's really the other way 'round: Regarding Cassini in particular and a lot of other things as well, I believe NASA expects itself to be more perfect than they have a reasonable right to expect they can be, based on past experience.
Their expectation that Cassini has less than a "one in one million" chance of failure is what I find absurd -- it may be true, of course, but their statistical reasoning, as best we can figure from the grossly uninformative public documentation, is weak and ignores reality. For example it's pretty clear that the testing for the plutonium containment consisted in many instances of one test unit, or maybe two. How sure can they be that the containment system will survive Titan explosions with so few experimental units? We did the same thing bombing Sudan -- one soil sample from outside the gate was all we took, and my understanding is the level in PPM or PPB or whatever, though elevated, was not really far outside nominal background levels of whatever it was they were looking for. We just can't be that careless anymore.
I only point out the various failures as ample evidence that NASA's claimed areas of comfort -- like the reliability of Titans -- are imaginary. But no, I am not "appalled" by the failures. I am appalled that NASA will (in short) not admit that these actual failure rates should influence their decision to carry nuclear (Pu 238) fuels rather than choose a perfectly acceptable alternative -- in this case, solar solutions. Take the SNAP-9A, in the 1960's. Dr. Karl Z. Morgan has testified in sworn hearings that he was told by NASA that that rocket had a one in 10 million chance of failure. Oops. Apollo 13 too, of course -- what really happened to that nuclear unit? NASA's claims of successful "burial at sea" are unproven.
Lastly, I must add that one of the biggest problems with the nuclear solution is that it always entails massive secrecy, security clearances, circuitous accounting methodologies, and even underhandedness and lies. It has no place as a part of a bed of scientific research, even if in reality the decision were somehow a right one to use nuclear. Fear of the "anti-nuke agenda" is not a sufficient justification for the secrecy. National security excuses are just that--excuses. Russia uses the same stuff, only worse as far as I can tell -- I don't think they use ANY containment system (like SNAP 9A). 72 pounds of Pu 238 shot into space could presumably never be a right decision, but perhaps the .001 Curie figure that Kai Petzke talks about as requiring International review, is reasonable. But not, no way, 400,000+ Curies at once. On board rockets that every reasonable person admits fail on a regular basis. That's madness.
I hope I've made my position more clear on that issue and again thank you for writing.
Russell Hoffman END OF RESPONSE
*** Japanese TV interview written answers
Note: This interview is also available at the NOFLYBY web site, which also contains an important letter from Selma Blackman, Executive Director of the War and Peace Foundation, addressed to the United Nations Ambassadors, and signed by numerous scientists and others.
Cassini questions posed to the editor of this newsletter by a Japanese news service which visited the editor at his office a few weeks ago:
NASA expects the probe to do the flyby of Earth in August, 1998. The closest moment is scheduled to occur August 18th, 1999. It will come less than 800 kilometers from Earth at that time, flying at nearly 70,000 kilometers per hour. NASA raised the altitude of the flyby from 500 kilometers to 800 kilometers a few months prior to launch in 1997, hopefully due to the many protests they received. They gave a reason, but it was unspecific. In other words, they said they raised it to keep the overall risk of reentry less than one in one million, but they didn't say what caused them to think they might have exceeded that magic number they claim to have achieved. It's voodoo science and should be debunked. Even if it isn't voodoo science it's something worse: it's hidden science, since the full details of the various weights they assign to everything is unknown, and getting any information from them at all is nearly impossible. For example, how have they calculated the effect years later of some miscellaneous bolt that was not tightened properly in the first stages of construction? What sort of software bugs might affect the command sequence? What chance of failure did they assign to space debris hitting the antenna base or coupling? Space debris is something NASA has miscalculated by several orders of magnitude in the past.
NASA assigned specific numbers for all this stuff, added it all together and that's how they came up with the risk factor of one in one million, but most of what they came up with were just wild guesses and the grand total is nothing more than a big guess made of thousands of smaller guesses.
Cassini will be doing what is known as a "gravity assist". The move changes the direction of the probe somewhat and adds tremendous relative speed to enable Cassini to make it all the way to Saturn. However, there were other possibilities and the move was actually unnecessary. Not only did NASA not need to carry the deadly plutonium in the first place because the Europeans have developed solar deep-space solutions, but they didn't really need to use Earth for the flyby maneuver at all either! NASA could have arranged to do the flyby using only other planets -- not Earth! (Cassini has already done a flyby of Venus).
This is one of the aspects of the mission which makes NASA's decision to use this dangerous option so peculiar. The Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators simply provide a modest amount of electricity for the mission. They are not "mission critical" as NASA would claim. In short, NASA didn't need to use them, so why did they do it? It is because the United Stated Government wants the public to accept nuclear launches for other purposes, such as military, and as a way to remove unwanted radioactive materials from Earth -- by blasting them out into space, a truly mad-scientist idea.
But in fact these launches should be stopped now and forever.
NASA claims that there is less than a "one in one million" chance of the probe slamming into Earth during the flyby maneuver. But this is the same NASA that estimated in 1963 that the SNAP 9A probe with a kilogram of plutonium had a one in ten million (1 in 10,000,000) chance of reentry into Earth's atmosphere, but it did. NASA was wrong. This is the same NASA that estimated that Challenger had a one in one hundred thousand (1 in 100,000) chance of catastrophic accident, but it blew up with a loss of all seven astronauts on board. And this is the same NASA which touted the Titan launch vehicle as one of the safest ever, which was used for Cassini, and which lost their second Titan in August, 1999 and then two weeks later, they lost the greatest new rocket, or what was supposed to be the greatest new rocket, called the Delta III. The only thing worse, really, than NASA's failure rate, is their consistent inability to accurately estimate that same awful failure rate. So in answer to what is the probability, only a fool would trust NASA's meaningless numbers! It's up there, it's coming back mighty, mighty close to us on purpose and if anything goes wrong, it's packing one heck of a punch.
Between now and the flyby, if Cassini is lost for any reason, that is, if it stops sending signals back so that we can track it, or if its reception antennas fail for any reason and we cannot communicate with it, it becomes a deadly poisoned pill in an orbit around the Sun which will be roughly the same as our own Earth's orbit. This would be very, very bad. It could lead to a collision with Earth decades or even centuries later, by which time NASA's fancy containment system for the plutonium payload may have become brittle and cracked, and no longer work. Most people who oppose Cassini today worry about the upcoming flyby, but I worry most about the time between now and then. If the probe is lost at any time in its flight, it is too small to be found and will pose an incredible danger to Earthlings for centuries. And we won't see it coming. We might not even see it hit us! A few wacky dosimeter readings, and perhaps decades later, an almost imperceptible increase in Cancer rates. Those might be the only clues. Japan has a holiday in honor of statistics, do they not? I hope they will look at the statistics of what Cassini can do.
NASA claims to be "biasing" the Cassini space probe away from Earth as it approaches us for the flyby, so that if anything goes wrong, it will miss Earth. But this so-called "bias" is a trivial amount, first of all -- only a fraction of a percent of 1 degree of arc, probably. For most of the trip, it's barely even a correctable amount of difference! Second of all, it would still leave the probe capable of coming back at a later date. If it is lost for any reason, its trajectory around the solar system will be unknown and unpredictable. Third, this so-called "bias" actually means that during the last few days before the flyby of Earth, NASA must actually fire the rockets on board Cassini in order to bias the probe back again, closer and closer towards Earth. They actually will fire the rockets to aim the probe towards Earth, and if any of these staged maneuvers results in an extended burn of the firing mechanism (as has happened with past NASA probes, which were thus lost in space (for example, Clementine)) that could be the ultimate cause of the disaster. I will continue hoping even up to the last few days before the flyby, that the world will suddenly become sane, at least temporarily, and forbid NASA from executing the unbiasing maneuver.
It depends on many factors. First of all, what attitude is the probe in when it comes crashing into Earth's atmosphere and heats up in a few seconds to 10's of thousands of degrees celsius? Will it be stable, or spinning, or tumbling, or "side-on-stable" as NASA refers to one orientation, or what? It matters a great deal, because NASA's published release rates for these various configurations vary from 3% of the plutonium being released as respirable particles, to 33%, to 66%, to even 97% or more. NASA seems sure that if by chance the probe crashes to Earth, luck will have it that it will be in what NASA considers the safest of these many configurations, but they don't really know. They are guessing -- voodoo science again.
In reality, anywhere from a kilogram, to up to the full load of nearly 30 kilograms of plutonium 238 (mostly) and plutonium 239, and a few other isotopes, could be released. But even a fraction of a kilogram of plutonium 238 is enough to kill -- by cancer, leukemia, or other health effect -- every man, woman, and child on the planet -- if you simply give everyone an equal portion of the whole. So even 3% could be an enormous and unnecessary tragedy. There are 270 billion (270,000,000,000) potentially lethal doses on board Cassini, and they may not spread out so nicely as NASA hopes. They may cluster.
The risk should have been avoided in the first place by replacing the nuclear fuel with solar panels. NASA could have done it, and should have done it.
A Cassini flyby accident could release literally millions of millions (10^12) of respirable particles of plutonium. A "guaranteed" lethal dose of plutonium is an invisibly-small particle -- you cannot even see it. A Cassini flyby accident or other reentry accident would not incinerate the plutonium. Although plutonium dioxide is very hot and can ignite fires when it is in chunks, plutonium does not in fact burn in a reentry accident, it vaporizes -- turns to very fine powder.
Vaporized plutonium can take weeks, months, or even years to fall to Earth, but most assuredly, it does fall eventually, then it might even be resuspended again. It is generally from 1 to 10 microns in size; which is even smaller than a "guaranteed" lethal dose, -- thousands of times smaller. But it is not a harmless dose, and it will be given to virtually everyone. With plutonium, even a single solitary atom of it can cause cancer or leukemia or genetic defects or other health effects if it is inhaled or ingested, as vaporized plutonium will be. It does its damage at the molecular level -- the product of its decay (an alpha particle) can damage the fragile DNA which most of our trillions and trillions of cells have. Roughly 50% of all plutonium-induced cancers are fatal even in developed countries; a far greater percentage are fatal in third-world countries. For NASA to risk spreading this amount of such a deadly poison throughout our ecosystem with nearly six billion souls on board is distressing, to say the least! Vaporized plutonium is the most dangerous form of it, because it can be inhaled. Even once it has settled to Earth it can still be ingested (consumed) by mammals and other lifeforms. Ingestion is perhaps several orders of magnitude less dangerous than inhalation (perhaps less) but it is not guaranteed safe, either. It is all a crap-shoot.
NASA has very few concerns. If you push them really hard on the idea that the amount of plutonium 238 they are using is dangerous, they will assure you that it cannot possibly be released. If you convince them that even their own documentation indicates it can, possibly, be released, they will tell you that anything that might be released will be spread so thin into the upper atmosphere that it will cause only an unnoticeable number of deaths, which they consider statistically insignificant. They claim, for example, that although as many as five billion of the Earth's population might absorb a dose, only about 130, or one in four million, would be likely to develop a "health effect" (1997 SEIS). But it really depends on many things. This is an average they have made up from thousands of separate and different disaster scenarios. It is NOT a true "worst case" scenario, although NASA presents their averaged accident as such. (That's the "Monte Carlo" simulation they do).
It's as if they referred to the worst possible car accident as one in which your car sustains minimal damage, because that is what most car accidents are. It ignores even a broken leg, it ignores deaths (except 130), it ignores more than five billion people absorbing a dose. It ignores reality.
Dr. Ernest Sternglass, professor emeritus of radiological physics at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine said that the folks at NASA "underestimate the cancer alone by 2,000 to 4,000 times" but even there, Dr. Sternglass is assuming the more likely scenario of a fairly even dispersal throughout the atmosphere. It is possible that Cassini will come down directly on a major metropolis, like Tokyo, Mexico City, New York, or anywhere else there are teaming masses. Winds may not favor a widespread dispersal by any means -- it might tend to stay clustered in a small area, and if that is a place where lots of people are -- that is the TRUE "worst case" scenario. The death, the pain and suffering, the loss of face and the financial losses that would occur -- these things are so terrible as to be beyond the ability to comprehend them. Cassini carries over 400,000 Curies of highly radioactive plutonium -- that is as many Curies of plutonium as the amount released from all the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, which now nearly everyone agrees was a health disaster for the world. Cassini in one shot can equal that total, and more, since all of those tests (except the second and third) were purposely done away from populated areas. Cassini could come down anywhere and touch all of us.
The author is the editor of the STOP CASSINI newsletter, and webmaster of the STOP CASSINI web site:
These opinions, while his own, are the result of dozens of interviews with top radiation and space scientists who opposed Cassini, and also the result of research efforts which included thousands of pages of NASA documents and numerous other sources.
AND IN CONCLUSION...
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Russell D. Hoffman
STOP CASSINI webmaster.
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