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I'm not going to bore the audience with a lot of other details, but my question is what assurance NRC is providing the public for the plant's life extension and license renewal despite the fact that I have found multiple discrepancies in the design control processes? Fabrication control processes of all the components, reactor analyses and associated parts, and I will go through a bunch of them as an example.

As part of the [In-service Inspection] ISI activities in 1996 at Dresden Nuclear Station, NRC found the wrong pump curve from Sargent & Lundy design analysis for the reactor, boiling water reactor, at Dresden. So they wrote a [10 CFR] 50.54(f) letter to ComEd despite the fact that ComEd, two boiling water reactors, Dresden, Quad Cities was on a watch list and Zion was a PWR on the watch list.

And as a result because I was working for Westinghouse and Stone & Webster and was a technical guy, I was promoted to go from engineering to quality assurance. That was the subject that I never wanted to touch because I knew at my best I would be everybody's enemy. That's number one. So I got a promotion. I went to the nuclear and here is a bunch of design analysis questions that NRC said okay, if you, Exelon, running all these plants and Sargent & Lundy is your major contractor and has made, you know,