

1 awful lot of information there. And, we know, your
2 sincerity is obvious.

3 MR. CAMERON: We're going to have to speak
4 up.

5 MR. TAPPERT: Speak up a little bit, I'm
6 sorry. Regarding license renewal, as we said earlier
7 in the presentation, when we look at the license
8 renewal application, we're kind of focused on the
9 aging management program from a safety standpoint.
10 And the rationale there is that -- what's new for an
11 additional twenty years? For the other aspects of
12 operation, the current licensing basis is carried
13 forward.

14 So [10 CFR Part 50,] Appendix B applies in
15 the current term, Appendix B will apply during the
16 future term. So there's no additional review, per se,
17 on that but those requirements are still in place and
18 if there's any violation that gets out of control, or
19 vendor suppliers, or what have you, those will be
20 followed up by inspection activities and other
21 mechanisms.

22 And certainly, you know, you sound to me
23 very familiar with our allegations process and, if
24 you've been making allegations, hopefully, the NRC has
25 been responding to you in keeping you apprised as to
26 the status of those reviews. We try to be very
27 responsive to those cases.

1 MR. CAMERON: We need to get you on the
2 transcript. Why don't you say what you're going to
3 say now, Oscar and we'll go on and then we'll get you
4 back up.

5 MR. SHIRANI: I followed the NRC
6 allegations exactly as the booklet over there and NRC
7 reviews has been only as a desktop review. They have
8 sent my, all allegations to Exelon to provide
9 independent review. They trusted Exelon that Exelon
10 can provide independent review and, you know, if I
11 wanted to do the investigations or the reports like
12 the NRC does, I could have sent my design checklist to
13 GE and say these are all the things I'm going to ask
14 you.

15 What I did at the GE, three months before
16 my audit, NRC did the inspections and they fully
17 endorsed the GE [Quality Assurance] QA program and I
18 mentioned that at the exit meeting. Once I went to
19 Holtech and U.S. Tool & Die and I attempted to put a
20 stop work, I was caught, caught and cursed, and used
21 F word against me, why I want to stop the production.
22 NRC was there six months before my audit and I have
23 documented in my executive report exactly what NRC
24 did.

25 NRC investigation is only looking at the
26 procedures, interview the managers and looking at some
27 documentation in a closed door. NRC's approach and I

1 told this to the Inspector General Assistant, George
2 Mulley, that these are just a desktop review. The
3 audit and inspection should be evaluated where the
4 rubber meets the road.

5 The shuttle [National Aeronautics and
6 Space Administration] NASA as you notice, that a foam,
7 non-safety related component failed and hit a safety
8 related component, which was not designed for that
9 speed. And that's one of the design sections of the
10 Code which I teach around the nation. And that is
11 coming to the point. David Helwig, who is in charge
12 of 7700 employees at the nuclear, has put, he did not
13 even understand the difference between commercial
14 grade dedication which is safety related with a
15 commercial grade item. This is a danger to the
16 public.

17 This man making the decision. This man
18 takes the QA which I was part of, takes it, puts it in
19 production, seven people running one hundred suppliers
20 and our chief who signs our audit report is only high
21 school kid. He's only worried about production. And
22 he admitted in the court, they said why, when Shirani
23 for two years was not allowed to go to GE to do
24 follow-up. He wanted to look at power uprate project
25 that's related to this. Why he was not allowed for
26 power uprate project? He said because Shirani's
27 audits are dealing with the calculations and I have

1 his transcription in the court and that gentleman was
2 recorded, he was in my court.

3 He said because he would have delayed the
4 LaSalle Power Uprate Project. The man with that guy,
5 Quality Assurance Criterion 1, it says production
6 under quality should not be in the same house. NRC
7 has approved that for one plant, Waterford 3, 1998 and
8 I'm going to make an allegation today and I have made
9 allegation to George Mulley that I would even reject
10 the idea of one plant out of 103 plants in the
11 country, that allows the quality assurance of the
12 safety related supplier in the hand of production.

13 David Helwig and Oliver Kingsley, once I
14 made that allegation, they send it to the NRC and NRC
15 said since we approved the Waterford 3, therefore, you
16 are allowed to do that. Therefore, I'm rejecting all
17 I have a big profile of twenty correspondences from
18 the NRC and I want a public hearing. I want a
19 Congressional Hearing and I want to tell the public
20 and I am going to make it in layman's term that a
21 seven year old kid understands my issue and worries
22 about their safety concepts. It's not the claim, I
23 have all the documents to support my allegations.

24 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Oscar, you know, we
25 heard that. We have it on the record. I think, at
26 this point, we should for the record just describe to
27 people what the NRC allegation process is. I think

1 we'd just restate what you said, John so that people
2 know that there is a process and obviously Oscar is
3 calling attention to perhaps some deficiencies in the
4 process but that the NRC takes these allegations of
5 safety deficiencies very seriously and has a process
6 in place to deal with allegations such as the type
7 that Oscar is raising.

8 And I think if you have anything more to
9 say about that, let's say it and get it on the record
10 and then go on and see if there's any other questions
11 and also get to the formal comment. I know that this
12 young lady wants to say something and I know that
13 we'll have Oscar come up again and Corey and others.
14 Okay, John?

15 MR. TAPPERT: Just what you just said,
16 Chip. I mean, the NRC has a program where, if any
17 member of the public has any concerns about safety
18 related activities at nuclear plants, they can come
19 forth to the NRC and we will follow up on those to
20 establish whether, in fact, there is an issue there
21 and take appropriate corrective action.

22 Now we can't speak to any -- you know, we
23 can't speak to those issues that you raised right now,
24 but certainly after the meeting or we can discuss what
25 other forms we can address as concerns.

26 MR. CAMERON: Any other questions about,
27 let's go back to the update as the Generic

1 Environmental Impact Statement license renewal or are
2 there any questions on those presentations? You don't
3 have any right now, okay. All right.

4 Let's go to public comment and we'll go
5 back for any questions that there might be. I'm going
6 to ask Cynthia Sauer to come up to talk to us and then
7 we'll go to Corey and then we'll go back to Oscar,
8 okay? And Cynthia, can we lower the microphone too
9 for her?

10 MS. SAUER: Good evening. Can everyone
11 hear me?

12 MR. CAMERON: That was good.

13 MS. SAUER: I want to thank you for the
14 opportunity to comment this evening. My husband,
15 three daughters and I moved to a small town outside of
16 Morris, Illinois, in Grundy County several years ago.
17 The County is made up of suburban and rural settings.
18 We never questioned if this small community had any
19 risk factors until 2001, when an eighteen month old
20 child, who happened to be a patient of mine, was
21 diagnosed with a brain tumor.

22 Three months later, my own seven year old
23 daughter was diagnosed with a brain tumor. Following
24 her diagnosis in the same year, two more pediatric
25 brain tumors were diagnosed. Amidst her surgery,
26 treatments, I began to question the etiology of this
27 sudden increase in pediatric brain tumors. I asked

1 alternative various professionals in the medical,
2 legal, academic and Federal institutions for
3 assistance. I learned some surprising facts and
4 information which I would like to share with you
5 tonight which have raised a serious concern in my mind
6 as well as many other parents.

7 In Grundy County, under the cancer
8 mortality rate of all ages, from 1996 to 1999, was
9 eighteen percent above the U.S. Infant mortality rate
10 has been on a steady increase. And in the County
11 from, and I want to make sure I state these right,
12 from 1995 through '99, it is forty-eight percent above
13 other Illinois counties and sixty percent above the
14 U.S.

15 The incidence of pediatric cancer is on
16 the rise. From one child under the age of fifteen
17 diagnosed in the late 1980s and one child in the early
18 1990s to six in the late 1990s. I am currently
19 waiting anxiously for the statistics for the 2000 time
20 period. I know of four.

21 During my inquiries, I would be asked
22 where I lived and, when I said Grundy County it first
23 amazed me and then I became curious, I would get the
24 same initial response, "Oh, you live near Dresden."
25 I learned some interesting facts about Dresden as
26 well. I was informed that the plant has the highest
27 airborne radioactive emissions of the 72 U.S. nuclear

1 plants. I was also informed that Exelon has admitted
2 to violating the EPA's Safe Drinking Water Act by
3 illegally dumping hazardous waste material for
4 approximately a 10-year time period in the 1990s and
5 agreed to a settlement with the Illinois Attorney
6 General's office.

7 Recently, I picked up my neighborhood
8 newspaper and read that Dresden has agreed to pay a
9 fine for giving inaccurate facts and their
10 spokesperson stated they acknowledged that they gave
11 incorrect and incomplete information to the NRC. It
12 was noted in this article that it was a willful
13 violation of NRC regulations. It appears that Exelon
14 has a willful disregard and disrespect for the current
15 rules and regulations of the various governing bodies
16 over them. And that these fines and these settlements
17 really do not have a sufficient impact on their
18 disposal wealth.

19 And they do not have a concern for the
20 safety, health and well-being of the public. I have
21 been advised by physicians, by medical researchers, by
22 geologists, physicists and, yes, even, and I want to
23 stress unofficially, by the EPA, to keep asking about
24 the safety of the nuclear facility in my area and why
25 the leading cause of death in an area that it says
26 here economically is not at high risk of cancer, has
27 as the leading cause of death, cancer.

1 I challenge you to take the responsibility
2 to strictly enforce your current standards and to
3 become much more actively involved in preventative
4 health issues and environmental issues.

5 I want to borrow an excerpt from an
6 author, Max Lucado, which to me seems very fitting at
7 this time. "This is no cruise ship we're on. It's a
8 battleship. We aren't called to a life of leisure.
9 We are called to a life of service. Each of us has a
10 different task. We're different, we are the same.
11 Each of us can tell of a personal encounter with the
12 Captain for each of us has received a personal call."

13 For those of you involved in the safety of
14 nuclear energy, who may have forgotten your call, I
15 feel that my Sarah can best remind you of your call
16 and your responsibility. And this is what Sarah told
17 me personally she wanted to say to you this evening.

18 MISS SARAH SAUER: Please protect the
19 children from this awful disease and don't put bad
20 things in our water, air and -- thank you.

21 MS. SAUER: And, in closing, I once again
22 challenge you to the call and I also ask for your
23 prayers for my Sarah and for all of the Sarahs in this
24 world. Thank you.

25 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you very much
26 Cynthia and Sarah. It takes quite a bit of courage to
27 come down and talk to us and thank you for reminding

1 us of that challenge and you do have and will have our
2 prayers for Sarah but thank you. Corey?

3 MR. CONN: Good evening. My name is Corey
4 Conn. I am here representing myself as an individual
5 member of the public and I am also a member of the
6 board of Nuclear Energy Information Service in
7 Evanston, Illinois.

8 My immediate concern is that a number of
9 site specific concerns that will be and are likely
10 being raised right now by engineers may, inadvertently
11 or purposely, be disregarded over such a period of
12 time that a number of reactors will in fact have their
13 licenses renewed when it is not in the public interest
14 to do so.

15 And I base this on a relatively small
16 sample. However, I believe it is significant, the
17 result of this sampling, because of the pattern that
18 has emerged. I wanted to point out that it is
19 absolutely essential to the underlying confidence and
20 faith that anyone may ever have in the work of the
21 Commission that a principal as important as the
22 independence of quality assurance from production,
23 that that be recognized and maintained. It is
24 enshrined in the [10 CFR Part 50,] Appendix B, however
25 I'm deeply concerned that there is an existing
26 gentleman's agreement that these need not be unheard
27 and can in fact be dismantled as needed during

1 corporate mergers.

2 For a recent example, the case of Mr.
3 Shirani. But I want to point out that the pattern
4 that I'm very concerned about is that engineers, in
5 very specific areas of expertise, have again and again
6 raised very valid and often completely unchallenged
7 technical concerns and they have received from their
8 employers, from the licensees, a very consistent type
9 of treatment.

10 I will just say very quickly the handling
11 of the concerns of Mr. Curtis Overall while working
12 with [the Tennessee Valley Authority] TVA. TVA
13 managers, I read now from the Circuit Court of
14 Appeals, a decision in the case 01-3724 [*Tennessee*
15 *Valley Authority v. United States Secretary of Labor,*
16 *59 Fed. Appx. 732, No. 01-3724 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2003)*
17 *(affirming DOL)*]. It states TVA managers decided to
18 rescind the June 2nd of '95 metallurgical report.
19 This June 2 report raised many troubling questions
20 that, if investigated, could have further delayed the
21 start-up operations.

22 Then TVA transferred responsibility for
23 [Problem Evaluation Report 9500246] PER 246 away from
24 Overall. Once Overall was removed from the process,
25 TVA declined to follow through with the remaining
26 investigatory steps called for in the corrective
27 action plan and summarily closed the file. The [U.S.]

1 Department of Labor [DOL] reasonably inferred that the
2 TVA managers were engaging in a cover-up of PER 246 to
3 prevent further cost delays to commencing operations.

4 And finally, the Department of Labor
5 reasonably inferred that part of this cover-up
6 included an organized scheme to remove Overall from
7 Watts Bar, and that's the facility in question at the
8 time. He answered by not filing a retaliation claim
9 by promising him what was represented to be an equally
10 attractive and secure job in the services
11 organization.

12 And then it came to a time when I met Mr.
13 Shirani and have been following how his valid and
14 absolutely undisputed technical allegations have been
15 handled first by the employer then by the Commission.
16 And it worries me because it's a small sample of two
17 cases that I'm familiar with. But in both cases, I
18 think wrongful, negligent and criminal actions have
19 been taken in an effort to promote production or to
20 pursue a schedule.

21 And I'm worried here at the time when we're
22 considering the extension of time and the renewal of
23 licenses, that these might be the fundamental
24 guideposts that the Commission works from when trying
25 to resolve difficulties or trying to accommodate
26 reality as it emerges. Now there is, depending on
27 which events you discuss, from Chalk River [in Canada,

1 1952], Windscale [Pile No. 1, in England, 1957], and
2 [Stationary Low Power Plant No. 1] SL-1 [in Idaho,
3 1961], and Fermi [Unit 1, in Michigan, 1966] in '66
4 and Three Mile Island [in Pennsylvania, 1979], my
5 goodness, I don't know, it depends on what level of
6 severity and where in the world -- one talks it is
7 possible to state that there is an interval or main
8 interval between actions that are severe. In
9 particular, those which go as vessel or resultant
10 fires that burn vigorously for days or eject molten
11 fuel from the apparatus.

12 But that interval is finite. It's difficult
13 to estimate. You'll get different answers depending
14 on who you speak to but where would each of us want to
15 be when it is said that at the next hour the Governor
16 is expected to make an address with regard to the new
17 update to the changing boundary of the evacuation
18 zone. Would we want to have enshrined and defended a
19 process which scrunches and eviscerates the warnings
20 given by the engineers or will we find that we've done
21 our best to publicize and to develop and respond to
22 the very real and I think insurmountable, possibly
23 insoluble technical problems that this has presented.

24 I can understand the investor's enthusiasm
25 to pursue license renewal but I find it really
26 unconscionable that we should be considering doing
27 this with this pattern in place. That's my concern

1 this evening. Thank you.

2 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you, Corey.
3 Oscar, I would ask you to, you had a couple of things
4 that you asked the NRC tonight. I think you probably
5 want to emphasize that again but I would ask you not
6 to necessarily go back through all the information
7 that you've already provided us but finish up saying
8 what you wanted to say. And so please give your name
9 again, so we have it.

10 MR. SHIRANI: [Referring to the Court
11 Reporter,] He was three days with me at the DOL here.

12 License renewal. It relies on the existing
13 analysis and the control of the existing analysis to
14 provide assurance that everything, all the
15 modification, all the design, all the orders has been
16 adequately controlled and everything is in process.
17 Therefore, you provide assurance to the public that
18 since I operated this plant for forty years, I can do
19 it another twenty years.

20 Now, once we came back from General Electric
21 with the findings, immediately Quality Assurance
22 Manager and engineering managers, they all agree to
23 the severity of the findings and they said stop work
24 is imminent. So the managers were there and they had
25 seen the calculations that they were familiar with and
26 the reactor analysis and the component analysis. They
27 said let's pick up few of his calculations to look

1 into it for operability concern. They called GE
2 immediately over the phone and GE did the analysis and
3 the analysis changed.

4 The reactor temperature and pressure for
5 that component in question was .53 psi left to the
6 margin. That was 1997. There was no power uprate
7 project. 1998 up until now, power uprate project has
8 been alive and kicking by Exelon at all of its nuclear
9 plants. If the component has only .53 psi allowable
10 for the reactor component and vessels that we
11 investigated, 50, and one of the calculations shows
12 that, [then] what assurance you going to give to ComEd
13 or to the public that Exelon is in control of the
14 design or that GE is in control of the design?

15 We would have had to stop work in three
16 months without verifying and the follow-up by Code of
17 Federal Regulations, is a willful and deliberate
18 violation of the Codes. License renewal is an
19 extension of acceptable deserving components. If we
20 don't have that assurance, for two years, the Code of
21 Federal Regulations, it says and also NRC says, the
22 significant condition and obligation of a technical
23 nature has to be resolved within one hundred and
24 eighty days.

25 Most of my allegations which was recorded on
26 December 3, 2001, to the NRC started after one year
27 just to look into it. They didn't even get up and go

1 to it and look at the design? Why didn't ComEd? Why
2 raise the [10 CFR] Part 21 issue in Zion? Or read the
3 Part 21 issues, they were buying mom-and-pop shop
4 commercial grade valve, upgraded to safety-related
5 analysis and they were shaving off the pressure bonnet
6 area.

7 And I was manager of the motor operated
8 valve seismic and the weak link analysis for four
9 years. I was in charge of 1600 safety-related valve.
10 I know what is original to your valve or residency of
11 the valve could impact the analysis. I find out that
12 these commercial grade items were put on a safety-
13 related pipe with no analysis. I raised that
14 question.

15 I came to the exit meeting. The Vice
16 President of the site and everybody was so upset from
17 engineering said, where are these analyses? I have a
18 letter that they confirm that I raised the Part 21 and
19 they admired me for that. That was the last time I
20 was ever allowed to go to any nuclear station and
21 ComEd as a technical specialist.

22 Now plant's life extension is a continuation
23 of the same garbage. If you don't have design
24 control, I have written many papers in [American
25 Society of Mechanical Engineers] ASME. One of the
26 curves that I have put in a stress versus a strain,
27 you have to operate in the elastic region. You are

1 not even allowed to reach the yield unless you do an
2 operability concern. You're supposed to stay in that
3 elastic region. If you don't have the control of the
4 design, you could be way above elastic region and you
5 could be in the plastic fracture and the material is
6 -- to be plastic, it could be glass.

7 And that's why I have allegation for the dry
8 cask storage. I understand your pain. None of those
9 casks that are sitting at Dresden loaded are
10 adequately controlled by design and I have raised that
11 to ComEd. I raised the level one framing, I shot down
12 GE. I raised a framing level one against ComEd
13 engineering and all the nuclear sites for not
14 reviewing the design analysis. Because [10 CFR]
15 50.54(f) letter from NRC, November 12, 1996, they told
16 ComEd, you don't have processes in place.

17 They went and put GE as a success, they got
18 attaboy because they hide the findings. They got
19 credit that now we know how you control your vendors,
20 that they may tell the truth because 50.54(f) letter.
21 And the truth here is on the watch list would have to
22 make NRC to shut down in the plant. And my manager on
23 November 19th of 1997, Mr. Edward Netzel, I told him,
24 don't lift the stop work. We have not verified the
25 corrective action from GE.

26 If the -- GE has been one hundred percent
27 suspect, you only can accept design analysis and the

1 approved quality assurance program not under suspended
 2 quality assurance program. Therefore, the requirement
 3 and the comment of Commonwealth Edison was you're like
 4 procurement plan. Procurement plan is not the
 5 procurement process that Exelon lied to NRC this is
 6 procurement process. And NRC without investigation
 7 says your procurement process is okay. Procurement
 8 plan was not the procurement process. Many of us did
 9 not understand that.

10 Procurement plan, I find Mr. Bill Bitaney,
 11 for one year I was chasing him around the whole State
 12 of Illinois to find him. He was the guy who was
 13 Procurement Manager. He had in his ex-wife's shed,
 14 found two copies of the 17 procurement plans that we
 15 wrote. 17 procurement plan was to put all of the
 16 design requirement of the ASME [Code, Subsection] NC
 17 and 10 CFR [Part] 50 criteria and three for the design
 18 control in the procurement plan, in order. Why?
 19 Because there is suspicions about the GE procurement
 20 program. So therefore, all the analyses done by GE
 21 has to come and be reviewed, prepared and approved by
 22 ComEd cognizant engineer, supervisor and a QA.

23 And I gave a copy of it to the NRC and I
 24 said this is about twenty-one. You know what NRC
 25 investigation after a year talking to the lawyers of
 26 the GE and they're coming back oh, they stop work that
 27 they did during that time was finished after lifting

1 stop work. I said first, I don't have no, I'm not
2 given no credibility and legitimacy to the lifting of
3 the stop work order in three months later.

4 GE said we have made corrective action.
5 Code tells me without you as a lead auditor, very fine
6 that and it's on the statement, on a [Freedom of
7 Information Act] FOIA this is information that Paul
8 Gunter and David Lochbaum in Washington has put a FOIA
9 and in that when Exelon admits that the QA lead
10 auditor is the one means to verify the corrective
11 action. I don't know how they slipped their hand
12 because they are master in falsifying record and I
13 have proof that we show to ALJ, but unfortunately
14 Administrative Law Judge doesn't understand technical
15 issues and I didn't expect it.

16 Dr. Landsman of NRC came and said false,
17 this is false information. August 4th of 2000, I
18 wrote my audit report of U.S. Tool and Die for the
19 cask, we did nine findings, embarrassing the NRC's
20 inspection, paperwork inspection. It was right in my
21 executive summary. That's why NRC did have no
22 incentive to really look into my case. They have to
23 side with ComEd. I am upset with the system. There
24 is a flaw in the system. There is written all over my
25 manager came to the court, one of my managers said
26 David Helwig told all the supply managers that Shirani
27 was not going to be promoted into nuclear. Even

1 before they kicked me to finance, I have enough
2 evidence to give the NRC. Dr. Landsman went and told
3 Shirani is removed out of the nuclear once he talked
4 to me seven days after November 30th.

5 And he was suspicious. He wanted NRC to
6 protect me. You know what they told the Federal
7 agent, NRC inspector. They said you cannot make an
8 allegation on his behalf, he has to come forward. And
9 you know what I did? Once I went forward, they
10 actually said it's too late. That's why I think it's
11 an incentive. My audits, I did not mean to embarrass
12 anybody. I followed the Code of the law and I
13 followed my job and I did my audit report. I'm very
14 proud of them. All the findings that I found are in
15 violation of the Codes that NRC has endorsed. None of
16 them is Oscar Shirani's belief. And I'm going to
17 stand above all of it.

18 Holtech, Exelon and all these guys telling
19 the news reporters for the last two, three weeks that
20 he is making up things. Why don't they come with all
21 their technical experts and prove me wrong? Why are
22 they trying to just mud the water and lie, the vicious
23 lies to just protect their own cost and schedule on
24 the product. It's very scary. Seven people are in
25 charge of one hundred suppliers of safety-related
26 components in all of their reactors of Commonwealth
27 Edison. Their manager is only highest one here. If

1 I admit any garbage in my design, he would not
2 understand it because he is the agent. And he said it
3 in the court.

4 MR. CAMERON: Oscar, I'm going to have to ask
5 you to sum up for us. I think that we get the concern
6 and seriousness of this and Mr. P.T. Kuo would like to
7 say something to you about that. But if you could
8 just finish up for us so we can go on. Thank you.

9 MR. SHIRANI: The reason I want to talk about
10 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix [B], because they are one
11 organization. My manager at the court says well,
12 there was a change in philosophy in ComEd at the time.
13 It used to be a company that kind of separated church
14 and state I would say, quality and production. And
15 that's why he did not want me to go in the power
16 uprate project in 1999, two years later, despite the
17 emphasis that the [Title 10 of the] Code of Federal
18 Regulation[s Part 50, Appendix B,] Criterion XV and
19 XVI and XVIII says for the control of design of
20 Section 3, that shall be prompt, within six months.

21 Two years later I was allowed to go to do
22 follow-up because all the manager were scared of David
23 [sic, Oliver] Kingsley and David Helwig. Now these
24 people are in charge of all these nuclear reactors.
25 It scares me. There is no oversight, absolutely there
26 is no oversight.

27 Criterion I of the 10 CFR [Part 50, Appendix

1 B] has been put in the garbage like those 17
2 procurement plans. And I made a copy of those
3 procurement plans. I gave it to the NRC. NRC did not
4 even follow it up. They did not even call the
5 attorney. His attorney said I am willing to talk.
6 They never even called him for the witness. They
7 never even called any of my witnesses. I have a
8 witness in Human Resources and I have his tape because
9 he put his message on my voicemail that they demoted
10 me in January 2000. Exelon with their exhibits, with
11 their repeated requests of the court, they could not
12 prove that they did not demote me.

13 Without even being kicked by the finance,
14 within a nuclear department for three years, I have
15 documented numerous examples of retaliation,
16 intimidation, pressure. Because why? Because I was
17 doing my job and I thought NRC would love me. I had
18 very much respect for the NRC but unfortunately since
19 November 1st when I walked over there and I went and
20 described the things, as soon as I discussed that Dr.
21 Landsman supported me, the NRC inspector, senior
22 inspector, dropped his pen and went like that in
23 disbelief. I know that's the result of investigation
24 is for everyone.

25 Sorry that I --

26 MR. CAMERON: That's not. I understand why
27 you're emotional about this obviously and thank you

1 for sharing that with us. P.T., do you want to say
2 anything?

3 MR. KUO: Yes, I just want to say to all of
4 you that have spoken, Ms. Sauer, Corey and Oscar,
5 okay. Anyway, based on what I just heard, it is a
6 very, very serious allegation that I don't know the
7 details about it, so I cannot comment on it too much.
8 But I want to make sure from what I heard from you is
9 that you have been in contact with NRC groups.
10 Whoever you dealt with, do you know who you dealt
11 with?

12 MR. SHIRANI: People from Region III and a
13 few --

14 MR. KUO: Okay. And have you gotten any
15 response to your allegation so far?

16 MR. SHIRANI: Last year I was supposed to
17 receive the result of my allegation.

18 MR. CAMERON: We're not getting this.

19 MR. SHIRANI: September 2002, I was calling
20 Jim Heller of NRC Region III, that I have more
21 information to share with you. He says Oscar you
22 don't need to come any more because our investigator
23 has finished his field work and then we're going to
24 wait and see. And I said how long is it going to
25 take? And she said about six to seven more weeks and
26 then I said okay, that's fine.

27 September, it took until the Department of

1 Labor went December 17 through 19 until April of 2003,
2 the [Administrative Law] Judge ruled that the lady who
3 laid you off from finance didn't know about your
4 particular activity. That's the only clause that I
5 lost the case, prima facie case. NRC two weeks ago
6 cut-and-pasted ALJ's response and said here is the
7 result. You applied for higher position. I did not
8 apply for higher position. NRC cannot even read the
9 stuff from Exelon. Exelon didn't even lie like NRC
10 did.

11 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thanks, Oscar. I think
12 it's time to finish up.

13 MR. KUO: Yes, to finish up. Thank you very
14 much again, Oscar. Again, I will say thank you for
15 taking your time to come here to let us know your
16 case, but, because we don't know the detail of it, we
17 cannot comment on it right now. But we will take your
18 case back and talk to whoever that has been dealing
19 with your case before and find out; and we will let
20 you know, okay? It appears that the NRC staff has
21 talked to you already so that, when we go back, we
22 will find out who that may be and we will let him know
23 that you were here tonight and told your case here.

24 MR. SHIRANI: I must add, I'm supposed to
25 meet the [Office of the Inspector General] OIG
26 assistant from July 21st and 22nd, because the request
27 came from the Senator Reid -- office to the OIG and

1 that's how I am meeting them on July 21st.

2 MR. KUO: Okay, very good. Thank you very
3 much. It looks like you also are familiar with the
4 license renewal process based on what I heard from
5 you. So you're understanding is correct, the license
6 renewal process is based on the assumption that
7 current operating reactors are safe to operate. That
8 part is correct. I want to confirm that and also I
9 don't want to have any technical arguments with you
10 here.

11 But, just based on what I heard a little bit
12 from you, I want to make sure that you know that there
13 are certain things that could be different than what
14 your understanding is. You talk about everything has
15 to be in the elastic range. I'm sure you are familiar
16 with the [ASME] Code. The Code says, depending on the
17 loading condition combinations that certain conditions
18 that the stress can go beyond yield. You understand
19 that, I'm sure. And that's all I want to say. And
20 thank you all and we will take your questions back to
21 the office.

22 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you very much,
23 P.T. Is there anybody else that wants to say
24 anything, ask any questions? Okay. Then I think I'm
25 going to ask John to close this out and please stay so
26 that we can talk to you after we adjourn the formal
27 part of the meeting. And I'm going to ask John

1 Tappert to close it out for us. John?

2 MR. TAPPERT: Thanks, Chip. And, once again,
3 thank all of you for coming. As Barry said earlier in
4 the presentation, the scoping period does continue
5 until September 2rd and we'll be happy to receive any
6 comments that you have between now and then. People
7 with the name tags will be staying after the meeting
8 if you have any additional questions or would like to
9 discuss any of the issues further. And once again,
10 thanks for coming and have a good evening.

11 (The meeting adjourned at 8:50 p.m.)
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