Too Little, Too Late: EHC letter today (October 1st, 2001) to the Calif. Coastal Commission
From: "Russell D. Hoffman" <email@example.com>
Subject: Too Little, Too Late: EHC letter today (October 1st, 2001) to the Calif. Coastal Commission
Cc: "Laura Hunter" <LauraH@environmentalhealth.org>, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, "Barbara Boxer, Senator (CA, D)" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, email@example.com, "Russell Wise, NRC" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Elmo Collins" <email@example.com>, "Pat Gwynn" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Clanon, Paul" <email@example.com>, "Ajello, Julian E." <JEA@cpuc.ca.gov>, "Wong, Zee Z." <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Clark, Richard W." <email@example.com>, "NRC" <firstname.lastname@example.org>,"Barbara Byron" <BByron@energy.state.ca.us>, Bob Aldrich <email@example.com>, "Steve Woods" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
To: Sara Wan, Director, California Coastal Commission (fax: 415-904-5400)
cc: Laura Hunter, Environmental Health Coalition
From: Russell Hoffman, Concerned Citizen
Re: Too Little, Too Late: EHC letter today (October 1st, 2001) to the Calif. Coastal Commission
Dear Director Wan,
It's a shame that the statement shown below from Laura Hunter, Director, Clean Bay Campaign, Environmental Health Coalition, San Diego, CA doesn't come from the whole of EHC, and it is even more of a shame that it doesn't call for the immediate AND PERMANENT closure of San Onofre Nuclear (Waste) Generating Station, and it is a shame the letter doesn't concentrate solely on that issue.
Laura Hunter's letter doesn't differentiate between the dangers from an attack on a tank of anhydrous ammonia and an attack at San Onofre. The immediate effects of an attack on San Onofre could easily be orders of magnitude worse, and portions of Southern California could be rendered uninhabitable for many millennia.
The California Coastal Commission needs to hold an emergency hearing with the intent of closing San Onofre and Diablo Canyon nuclear power plants, with no IFS, ANDS, or BUTS, and most of all, with NO MORE DELAYS. (As explained in the attached documents you DO have the power to do this.)
The reality is that we need to close those plants. Attached is a list of 25 ways they are vulnerable to terrorism. There are 1000 more. Please read (or reread, since I have sent some of these to you already) the articles at the following URL:
Especially, please read my letter to Lissa Adams, who works at the Environmental Health Coalition, and my answer to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's September 21st, 2001 press release about airplane strikes against the plants.
Your commission has been lied to year after year after year by the nuclear industry, the NRC, and the DOE (Department of Energy). They've lied about Yucca Mountain. They've lied about robustness of the plants. They've lied about what they've studied and what they haven't. It's time to take back control of these plants and SHUT THEM DOWN.
I am "cc'ing" this response to Laura Hunter at the EHC in the hopes that she will consider endorsing a more reasonable and stronger statement in support of the permanent and immediate closure of the plants.
Russell D. Hoffman
Included below are some links and quotes, a statement about ways terrorists can destroy San Onofre, and Laura Hunter's letter to your commission today
Rebuttal to the NRC's September 21st, 2001 Press Release:
Letter to Lissa Adams, Environmental Health Coalition (written September 24th, 2001):
Read about Nevada politician's and citizen's reactions to Yucca Mountain, as well as a statement from September 11th, 2001 about America's vulnerabilities, which includes a discussion of a conversation with Charles Marschall of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about airplane strikes which this author had in June -- and which I relayed details of to your commission long before this terrorist attack!:
"Our laws which ceded jurisdiction to the Federal Government were absolutely clear on one thing: If the Feds did not operate the plants safely, we must take control back." (A discussion of California's responsibilities to protect Californians):
Read my discussion of the issues which I submitted to you on June 13th, 2001:
The comments below are that submission:
>>>>> FROM STATEMENT TO THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, JUNE 13th, 2001 >>>>>
We don't need San Onofre Nuclear Waste Generating Station. Close it down! If you reject it completely you won't be the first. Whole countries have done so. Counties, cities, and millions of people reject it. You can too.
Look at the NRC's own statistics on how bad an accident can be. CRAC-2 is a famous report that needs no introduction to most activists, an NRC report you've probably never looked at. Look at it. Learn the facts.
You don't care about all these facts people have presented you. You think the NRC is right to claim that by some fantasy on their part, you are not allowed to care about all these facts. But your life, my life, everyone's life depends on you understanding these facts. No law should override that. We have a right to protect ourselves.
Energy solutions exist, which are technologically feasible, some large scale, some small scale, which are absolutely cost effective compared with nuclear, coal, oil, etc., and far safer, more reliable and cleaner. You can't guarantee with any certainty, that you can prevent all possible apocalypses from nuclear power along our coast -- the Acts of God and terrorists, and stupidity that can wreck the plant. Earthquakes, Tsunamis, Airplane Wrecks, RPGs (Rocket-Propelled Grenades), dropped loads, worn parts, improperly closed or opened valves, inattention, etc..'"
<<<<< END OF CLIP FROM STATEMENT TO THE CCC <<<<<
>>>>> The item below was sent to U.S. Citizens, and also to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Governor of the State of California: >>>>>
September 27th, 2001
Re: 25 simple ways terrorists could destroy San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and make SoCal uninhabitable for many millennia -- have a nice day!
Included below are several items:
1) Comments by a friend on Nuclear Power Plants. If you agree with its sentiments, please sign your own name to it and send it to your local paper or government officials. This will be consistent with the wishes of the writer.
2) A letter by Hoffman to the North County Times yesterday regarding their front-page news article. (The NC Times did not publish this letter.)
3) Followup commentary also sent to the NC Times (also unpublished).
4) 25 simple ways terrorists could destroy San Onofre Nuclear (Waste) Generating Station.
This list has been compiled and presented as a public service because until we admit these vulnerabilities exist, nuclear power plants (NPPs) won't be shut down and thus they remain at their highest state of immediate and overwhelming danger. Once shut down, they are still dangerous and vulnerable to terrorism, but far less so.
>>>>> Comments by a friend regarding NPPs (permission has been granted to freely reprint and reuse): >>>>>
I don't think any rational person thinks a NPP can withstand the type of
attacks that took the WTC down. They simply were not designed for it. It was
interesting the convoluted path the NRC took till that was finally admitted.
If one is deluded to believe that an NPP could withstand a large intentional
plane crash then the question becomes, How about 2? 3? 4? Or put another
way; How many 767s diving out of the sky can a NPP survive? Since clearly
terrorists will potentially hijack enough to do the job.
After the 11th are there still people who doubt that these people will
choose those targets that do the maximum damage to our feelings of security
and cause the greatest financial and human impact?
They succeeded royally in their first attempt. Death toll around 7,000, a
trillion dollar financial blow and they have virtually wrecked a whole
segment of the economy by scaring the country off the airlines.
What would be a more appropriate target then our NPPs. If they attack and
destroy one, they will cause massive destruction and deaths then the others
will be ordered shut and even though alternatives could eventually be
brought online over the next several years, the immediate impact would be
harsh and expensive.
How many NPPs have been designed to withstand having thousands of gallons of
burning jet fuel spread throughout the facility? So basically I think an impact
will cause a potential breech of the containment facility and considerable
damage to supporting systems with the ensuing fire causing total failure of
the human and automated systems causing the plant to catastrophically fail.
<<<<< END OF COMMENTS BY A FRIEND <<<<<
>>>>> LETTER TO THE NC TIMES RESPONDING TO THEIR ARTICLE ABOUT SAN ONOFRE: >>>>>
September 26th, 2001
Editor, North County Times
To The Editor,
On the front page of today's NC Times, Ray Golden, spokesperson for San Onofre Nuclear (Waste) Generating Station, says he, "had always been taught that we were designed specifically for large plane crashes...That was incorrect." If Mr. Golden "had always been taught that", then he should be able to document WHERE he learned it. If he can't he's a liar. [Note to readers: In today's NC TImes (September 27th, 2001), Golden has mentioned a decades-old "test" where they rammed an old jet on a rocket sled into a concrete wall, as if that is in some way equivalent to a 767 crashing into, say, the spent fuel pool and/or the control room, or even various parts of the containment dome where there are holes for pipes, replacement parts, new and spent fuel, and people to go through. -- rdh ]
But that wouldn't be the first time. Last August Golden stated that the pressure vessel inside the containment dome could not suffer a catastrophic failure if the circular cracks found in other similar PWRs (Pressurized Water Reactors) also occurred at SON(W)GS, because, he said, they have equipment to detect slow leaks. But circular cracks don't necessarily have slow leaks before they have catastrophic failures.
Furthermore, the "light plane crash" Southern California Edison now says they had actually analyzed, undoubtedly wasn't full of incendiaries. Now we know it would be.
Golden tells us that a commercial jetliner impact wasn't considered because SON(W)GS isn't under any flight path "for any large airport". But anyone who has looked up in the sky around the plant knows large jets fly overhead regularly.
In June, Golden accused the opposition of being "completely misinformed and they don't understand the laws of physics". That very day, San Onofre dropped an 80,000 lb load when a strap broke. A properly lifted load would have used an I-beam to distribute the weight so that the loss of one strap wouldn't result in a dropped load. So who doesn't understand the laws of physics?
This year, workers at SON(W)GS spilled about 20 gallons of extremely volatile hydrazine (aka rocket fuel). Also, there was an explosion and fire in the switchyard, and another in the turbine room that put one entire unit out of commission for four months.
In order to properly protect the public, a 25-mile no-fly zone must be immediately declared around all nuclear facilities around the country. There is no way to tell friend from foe until it is too late otherwise. The sites need a much stronger perimeter fence, higher and with more barbed wire, and additional concrete barriers. But most importantly, San Onofre must be shut down immediately and rendered impossible to restart. This would prevent the worst possible scenario: A takeover of the control room.
Nuclear energy has never been profitable, when all the costs are considered. Now the costs have suddenly and permanently skyrocketed, along with an increased public awareness of the risks. But these risks were there all along, and the NRC got a "bye" September 11th, 2001. We might not be so lucky next time.
Forcing the plant employees to carry photo badges at all times is utterly insufficient window dressing.
Breck Henderson of the NRC is quoted saying activists aren't facing reality (NT Times, September 26th, 2001)! The nerve! He claims the plants are safe against tsunamis, earthquakes, tornados and "other natural or man-made disasters". Sure, they can withstand small tsunamis and minor earthquakes, but to simply say the plants are "safe" against these threats is another big lie! And no plant has ever actually been through a tornado, either. Asteroids are not considered a credible threat because they don't happen often enough for the NRC to notice (nor did terrorism until September 11th, 2001). The reality is that hundreds of tons of debris fall from the heavens onto Earth every year. Some makes it all the way to ground at high speed.
Henderson says "we can prepare for enemy bombers flying over ... or tanks rolling up...if you have a military threat here in this country". Well, we have a threat, and they are NOT prepared.
The last paragraph of the article contains the biggest lie of all -- that an accident "could kill hundreds of people initially...". Try tens of thousands initially, and MILLIONS "over the years". Your numbers are off by many orders of magnitude.
Nukes are extremely vulnerable, unlike renewable energy sources such as wind, wave, tide, solar, hydroelectric, geothermal, biomass and other sources. All the nukes should be closed down immediately.
Russell D. Hoffman
<<<<< END OF FIRST LETTER TO THE NC TIMES, SEPTEMBER 26th, 2001 <<<<<
>>>>> FOLLOWUP LETTER TO THE NC TIMES: >>>>>
September 26th, 2001
To the Editor,
Lest we forget, the following paragraph appeared in the North County Times September 12th, 2001:
"Golden said the control room, spent-fuel facilities and all safety-related systems are protected by structures built to withstand any plane crash."
He was rebutting my quote which was in that same article. But what I said was true. Not just what you quoted but everything else I have ever written to you about San Onofre. It's all ugly and scary and nasty to have to think about, but true.
Golden's September 12th statement was very, very strong and unequivocal. The moral crime Golden committed by lying to the public about this vital safety issue was not righted by Mr. Golden now saying, in your paper today, "I had always been taught that we (sic) were designed specifically for large plane crashes... That was incorrect." I wish to know where he got that "information" he had "always been taught"?
His additional comments in today's article, that Southern California Edison has analyzed the effects of a "light plane crash" ALSO contradicts his September 12th statements, because a "light plane" is not "any plane".
And lastly, when he says, "A commercial airplane crashing into (the concrete containment domes) was not considered a credible threat" that statement too, contradicts his claim that he had "always been taught..." -- and those two statements appear in the same article!
Ray Golden has lied to you again and again and again. I hope you are starting to figure out who your friends REALLY are.
<<<<< END OF FOLLOWUP COMMENTS TO THE NC TIMES 9/26/2001 <<<<<
25 simple ways terrorists could destroy San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and make SoCal uninhabitable for many millennia:
1) Hijack a commercial jetliner ala WTC/Pentagon/PA disasters. If one isn't enough, hijack two. If two isn't enough, hijack ten and be sure.
2) Rent, or even buy, a corporate jet so no pesky passengers can take back the cockpit like what happened in PA. It would do plenty of damage, if not quite as much as a jumbo jet. If one isn't enough, rent two...
3) A boat-bomb or depth-charge-carrying boat could be maneuvered over the outflow tubes from the plant, which are each over a mile long and are marked on navigation charts so that people don't drop their anchors on them. Destroying them would destroy San Onofre's ability to cool itself. (These tunnels may also be vulnerable to collapse when the waters recede just prior to the arrival of a tsunami (as they always do), an effect the NRC did not ever investigate despite professional advice that they should.)
4) Steal a tank (as a depressed ex-soldier did in San Diego a few years back) and ram it through the gate at San Onofre.
5) 50-caliber machine gun bullets would penetrate the coolant pumps, the pipes, the control-room, etc. You can bicycle up to the plant with a machine gun in a kiddie trailer, or simply stop your truck on the highway (I-5) which runs past the plant, and blaze away. You could get thousands of rounds in before anyone could stop you. Sure, you might not start a sequence which results in a catastrophic meltdown if you just start shooting without knowing your target well. But then again, the large front-page aerial photo of the plant which was published yesterday in the North County Times should give you more than enough information to aim at the most vulnerable sections.
6) Until just recently the NRC published the GPS locations of the plants to 6 decimal places. (That web page has been taken down since September 11th, 2001.) Terrorists could target a cruise-missile against the plant, or a ballistic missile, using these values. A well-aimed ballistic missile wouldn't even need a warhead. It's kinetic energy would be enough to destroy the plant. And removing the locations from the web site is window-dressing at best, since the plants are kind of hard to hide in the real world. Just ride by on your bike and get the necessary coordinates with your portable GPS.
7) Throw a short-circuiting-bomblet or grenade at the switchyard and other electrical areas of the plant. This would render it useless and could cause a meltdown as well. (A "short-circuiting-bomblet or grenade" is a small device that contains not shrapnel but long wires which criss-cross the target's electrical cables and short everything out. NPPs need constant, reliable off-site power to run, or they must use their emergency backup diesel generators (which often don't start properly when they are tested, and can also be shorted out along with the rest of the station). Yes, these bombs exist and we used them in Kosovo.)
8) Replace various pages of the control-room operating manuals with ones that contain misinformation so the operators do the wrong thing sooner or later. (Requires one inside person; could be done years before the accident occurs. It could already have been done at numerous NPPs and we just don't know it.)
9) Get an insider to do something. Insiders have access to many vital areas of the plant. There are thousands of workers at each plant. Some are always disgruntled about one thing or another. And some might accidentally say things at a party or somewhere, which others can use.
10) Derail a high-speed train off its tracks, which go by only about 100 to 200 feet away from the plant. With a little care and a bit of luck, the train could actually be driven towards the plant by weakening the rail on the plant side so the train falls towards that side.
11) Derail or blow up a chemical train on the tracks nearby. Such an accident would probably kill everyone at the plant, which would probably lead to a meltdown.
12) Mortars can be lofted into the plant from miles away, including a nearby highway rest area, a state park, or from the Interstate itself. One might call these a "drive-by war."
13) Crop-duster planes can be filled with gasoline instead of pesticides, then the pilot simply turns on the vents in the final second or two before impacting the plant. The fireball would be tremendous.
14) Rent a piece of construction equipment such as a Caterpillar, and simply aim it for the control room and let it roll. Even if they kill the driver they probably can't stop the vehicle.
15) Rent a truck and fill it with explosives (as Timothy McVeigh did in Oklahoma City). There are not nearly enough perimeter controls to prevent this. Although the gates appear to be guarded, there do not appear to be nearly enough physical barriers, especially for a delivery truck which has already made it past the perimeter on false pretences. (Even the plant's soda machines need someone to come in with enough materiel (in cans, which cannot be x-rayed) to blow the place to smithereens.)
16) Use two vehicles -- one to draw away the limited number of guards at the plant, the other, which arrives a few seconds later from a different direction, actually does the damage. A motor home at the state beach nearby could be filled with terrorists who could take over the control room.
17) Steal some of the military training equipment on the base at Camp Pendleton. This writer rode his bike over 20 miles on that military base four months ago without being questioned or stopped, along with an ex-Navy Seal. We did not realize the significance of our sojourn at the time.
18) Get an insider in the U.S. military to attack the plant with an A-10 Warthog or Apache helicopter. This isn't as far-fetched as it may sound. A few years ago a distraught A-10 Warthog pilot suddenly veered off course from his training mission, and flew 800 miles before running out of gas and crashing into the side of a mountain. He carried four 500-lb bombs at the time as well as machine-gun ammunition.
19) Since there is not a no-fly zone around the plant, any plane that attacks it gets a free ride all the way in. No one can challenge a plane which has not sent an "I have been hijacked" signal and which is flying in legal airspace. The nearest civilian airport is about 10 miles away, or about 5 minutes away for even the slowest airplanes. Our military could not possibly react in time.
20) Besides dropping depth-charges on the outflow tunnels (see item #3, "boat-bombs"), you could maneuver a boat very close to the plant, which is located at the ocean's edge, and shell the plant from the boat. There are numerous civilian harbors, beaches, etc. near the plant.
21) Multiple small planes can attack the plant at one time, overwhelming even a sophisticated air defense system.
22) ASL -- Air, Sea, Land. Terrorists can utilize all three at once to overwhelm the defenders.
23) NBC -- Nuclear, Biological, Chemical. Terrorists can attack the plant with BC to kill the operators and the security forces, and then calmly walk in and take over the plant.
24) (Censored -- the terrorists might not have thought of this one.)
25) The terrorists can simply wait for a meltdown to occur due to a natural disaster such as a tsunami, earthquake, or tornado, or due to a manufacturing defect, or operator error. The bottom line is, we have terrorists in Southern California. Their name is Southern California Edison.
Note: This list was thought up and compiled on September 27th, 2001. I'm sure the terrorists are much better at thinking these things up than I am and have considered all these possibilities and many more. Their failure to act might be because they can't decide which one suits their purposes the best. There is only one solution, even though it's only partially effective: SHUT THE PLANTS DOWN! A closed and inoperable nuke is much less vulnerable than one which is running.
Russell D. Hoffman
SHUT THE NUKES DOWN NOW! Help make the world a safer place for everyone.
For more information please see:
<<<<< END OF "25 SIMPLE WAYS TO DESTROY SAN ONOFRE" <<<<<
>>>>> BELOW IS LAURA HUNTER, EHC'S OCTOBER 1ST, 2001 STATEMENT TO THE CCC: >>>>>
At 01:16 PM 10/1/01 , Laura Hunter wrote:
October 1, 2001
Chairman Sara Wan and Coastal Commissioners
California Coastal Commission
45 Fremont Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94105-2219
RE: Environmental Health Coalition request to California Coastal Commission to initiate actions in the coastal zone to improve safety and security of human populations.
Dear Chairman Wan and Commissioners :
On September 11, 2001, our world changed forever. The tragic events that unfolded clearly have shown us that we are vulnerable. They also showed us that there is no need for such groups to bring weapons to our populations but that they can turn our own "resources" against us in a devastating manner.
As the largest military compound in the world, San Diego county is especially vulnerable to such attacks. Even the most cursory review shows that options for such misuse of potentially lethal resources are abundant in the San Diego coastal zone. There are multiple naval nuclear reactors on vessels in the Bay. While we know they are designed to withstand battle shock, we don t know about their ability to withstand a jumbo jetliner crash. We do know that San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) is not designed to withstand such an event. High-level radioactive waste stored at SONGS and other radioactive wastes on NASNI and the Submarine Base are also of concern. An attack like that in September is not the only scenario that one can imagine which could devastate our region. There have been calls from many quarters about protection and safeguarding existing nuclear power plants until a long term strategy has been developed and pursued.
In addition, the non-nuclear threats of our region also deserve serious attention such as the tanks of anhydrous ammonia on Navy bases and Port and industrial facilities (co-generation) as well as tanks of chlorine at water treatment plants and other industrial sites. These are acutely hazardous materials and could cause massive death and suffering if they were released into communities. In many cases, these chemicals are located near population centers.
Our safety is at risk.
We are virtually unprotected. We still do not have site-specific emergency response plans around the naval reactors. There is no monitoring, coordinated warning system, or effective education programs around the nuclear bases and we do not know the worst-case scenario analysis and so cannot even effectively plan.
As we look to the future, our risk is increasing. There is another nuclear carrier due to arrive in San Diego next month and then another after that. The Navy is currently planning to build five more nuclear-powered aircraft carriers some of which will likely be home ported here. SONGS generates large amounts of high-level nuclear waste every day it is operated and there is no safe manner or place in which to store this material. Two of the reactors are still in operation. The problem is only growing.
We need a strategy for safety.
We are asking the Commission to initiate the following actions designed to set a course to improve the safety and security for all residents in San Diego/Tijuana region. Your coastal purview means that the CCC is uniquely poised to coordinate and ensure that these actions are effectively taken.
EHC requests that the CCC take the following actions:
1. Initiate a program to evaluate the vulnerability of the chemical and nuclear hazards in the San Diego coastal zone and develop a prevention and safety improvement plan to address them. This initiative should include:
identification and assessment of impacts of all major nuclear and chemical hazards in the coastal zone;
highly coordinated and site-specific emergency planning in communities that could be impacted by nuclear and chemical releases;
monitoring around all naval and commercial and research nuclear reactors in the county;
warning systems developed in the coastal zone communities that are most at risk;
effective education programs about the hazards and proper response and ensure that materials are available in all languages to meet the needs of the populations at risk;
analysis of improvement necessary to maximally protect tanks of hazardous materials such as anhydrous ammonia and chlorine gas.
analysis and recommendations on additional security (personnel and structural) needs around nuclear and chemical hazards.
2. The CCC should develop and communicate a Safety through Prevention position on the existing and future nuclear and chemical hazards in the coastal zone to support public dialogue on prevention of risks. When it comes to chemical and nuclear hazards, true protection only comes from prevention. CA Safety through Prevention position should include:
Request to the Navy to abandon the use of nuclear propulsion in the next generation of aircraft carriers and seek opportunities to use other technologies.
Support for the fast-tracking for closure and cleanup of SONGS and replacement with aggressive investment in renewable energy sources and conservation.
Support of a re-evaluation of new locations for the existing nuclear carriers that are further from existing human population centers.
Endorse the Military Environmental Responsibility Act (HR 2154) that would ensure an equal level of regulation of all military operations.
It is important for effective public dialogue that the Commission speak out on these matters. We request that the CCC communicate this position to our Congressional delegation, Governor Davis, the City Councils of the communities in the coastal zone, and the Navy.
We are not without options for safer action
In 1998, the Government Accounting Office published an in-depth report on the cost-effectiveness of nuclear propulsion in aircraft carriers. They determined that nuclear propulsion was not cost-effective, not necessary, required a larger fleet of carriers due to maintenance requirements, and raised State Department concerns with forward deployment. Other technologies were recommended for analysis for aircraft carrier propulsion that were more efficient, less expensive, and non-nuclear. We must recognize in the aftermath of September 11 that, if we are going to have carriers near densely populated they should be constructed with safe, alternative, and cost-effective propulsion systems. Instead, the Navy is proposing to build five more nuclear carriers even when we it is clear that we can have carriers without the nuclear risks.
Instead of being "too cheap to meter", nuclear power has shown that it is too dangerous and too expensive to maintain. An energy policy and future based on renewables, conservation, and truly green technology must be pursued. There is no better time than now to move in this direction.
We could gain additional protection and critical information in our region if the Navy was required to comply with the same laws and regulations as all entities. This would be the first step in ensuring that we had equal protection regarding chemical and nuclear hazards. H.R. 2154 the Military Environmental Responsibility Act would require the military to follow the same laws as other entities.
EHC and its members would welcome the opportunity to work with the Commission on these recommendations and would diligently seek funding and support for it from our local, state, and federal elected officials.
We will be in attendance at the Public Comment period at your October 10, 2001 meeting to speak to this issue. We look forward to your serious consideration of this important and urgent request.
We are only a month from the horrific and tragic events that have changed our world forever. We must recognize that now is the time to re-evaluate our conditions and set a course for a safer more secure future. We urge you to join us in that effort.
Laura Hunter, Director
Clean Bay Campaign
Time to secure our nuclear power plants, North County Times, September 30, 2001
Hazardous materials threat assessed, San Diego Union Tribune, October. 1, 2001
Executive Summary: Results in Brief, Navy Aircraft Carriers: Cost-Effectiveness of Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered Carriers, August, 1998
Environmental Health Coalition
1717 Kettner, Suite 100
San Diego, CA 92101
FAX (619) 232-3670
<<<<< END OF LETTER FROM LAURA HUNTER, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH COALITION, TO THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, OCTOBER 1ST, 2001 <<<<<
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