Dear XXX,

 

Your Newshour(?) T. V. interview comments last week on Iran's nuclear development program were very well taken! I worked at the International Center for Theoretical Physics (www.ictptrieste.org) [of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria, then under moronic Hans Blix, now run by Egyptian Muslim El Baradei] in 1992 (see STEVE COLL article attachment) when MANY Iranians showed up because, assistant to pious Muslim Dr. Abdus Salam (Nobel Laureate in Theoretical Physics, but also former head of Pakistani AEC; do a google search on "Abdus Salam" and download his obituary (~1995 or 6), was/is still(?) a Dr. HAMADI, an Iranian! At any rate, AVAILABLE (see "Available at ICTP" attachment) both THERE in TRIESTE, with a duplicate set in Vienna, Austria, are ~ 37 YEARS of detailed dossiers on ANY/ALL not just physicists [but all sorts of other types of scientists: chemists, biologists, etc.,  and all sorts of types of engineers: nuclear, chemical, biochemical, etc. etc.] who have ever visited there, and a check on their website www.ictptrieste.org will verify literally several hundred courses/meetings/conferences there yearly (often several concurrent each week!), each attended by anywhere from 50 to 100 scientists/engineers (NOT just theoretical physicists, but ANY/ALL sorts of engineers and scientists: chemistry, biology, computer, etc. etc.) and assuming say ~ 50% of attendees from U. S., Europe and Japan, and say ~ 25% repeat visitors, maybe ~ 10-15% are from Muslim/Arabic countries. The older ones could be directors/planners of their country's WMD; the younger could be would be Islamic fundamentalist (WMD and other conventional weapons) martyrs.

 

So, this database could be an intelligence bonanza, and NOT to be seized NOR stolen, but a REAL-time ON-going CONSTANTLY ACCRUING database. And my contact was/is the clerk who photographs, fingerprints, etc. and has charge of the dossiers of all visitors there ever; he's sitting there five days a week, eight hours a day, twiddling his thumbs in boredom, in complete charge of maintaining and growing these files, with a camera (part of his job)! With a payment per dossier, he could easily photograph them all on a daily basis, providing an ON-going REAL-time, EVER-ACCRUING database intelligence source on technical "people of interest" vis a vis WMD!

 

And, in addition to the MANY IRANIANS, also NORTH Koreans popped up there (Trieste and Vienna) and then (1992), but also in the last decade since as attendees to many scientific/engineering conferences in the USA that I have attended, often being visitors if not employees, at U. S. DOE National Laboratories (LANL, LLNL, Sandia, etc.)!

 

This information is the Part 2.

Part 1 may also be of interest to you vis a vis counter-terrorism against U. S. nuclear-reactor power-plants /chemical plants, etc.

 

Please contact me with any questions, comments, etc. if I can be of any further assistance!

 

Most Respectfully,

 

Dr. Edward Siegel

 

tel: (858) 270-5111

 

[HARD to reach by phone; No voicemail; NO call-waiting; often online/dialup;

BEST, PACIFIC-time:

Mon & Fri: t < ~ 1:00 - 2:00 PM; t > ~ 4:00 PM;

Wed: t < ~ 10:00 AM; t > ~ 4:00 PM;

Tue, Thur: t > ~ 4:00 PM;

weekends: t < ~ 11:00 AM or noon or ~1:00 PM (depending upon recreational plans)]

 

---

 

Subject: FYI:

Part 1: BEWARE NRC/Utility (ex: San Onofre etc.) "Assurances"!!! (ONE attachment);

Part 2: BEWARE VISITORS to SD Technical Meetings/Conferences!!! & REAL-time ONGOING INFO. SOURCE DATABASE AVAILABLE!!!(TWO attachments relevant to Part TWO!)

Gentleman:

 

 Nuclear utility (San Onofre) and USN nuclear navy facilities "safety" are at best MISinformed platitudes, if not outright lies! (see Part 1 below).

Neither is to be trusted, as I discovered in the 1970's, first as Senior Metallurgist building nuclear navy reactor cores at Westinghouse, then as Chief Metallurgist and Manger of non-destructive testing/evaluation (NDT/E) for the largest nuclear utility in the country, then as an international nuclear materials consultant for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Indonesia and Vienna, Austria.

 

At best they are in denial, but at worst they are joint perpetrators of FRAUD, as (see many many sections and one attachment in Part 1).

 

Aside fom these necessarily technical details, the LARGE carriers are POINT BLANK range for a stinger shoulder fired missile fored from Tijuana, MEXICO, where a little money can go a very long way, as any would be terrorist Arab/Muslim with an IQ above zero will most certainly eventually figure out. When I was on the Stennis (right after the Cole attack!), I was shocked to find out that they STILL didn't even fly a fighter CAP patrol over SD Harbor and all tr nuclear ships here! (They somehow expected any would be terrorists to charge up the gang-plank with cutlasses I guess)

 

Having recently learned of this San Diego Network for Homeland Security Taskforce on KPBS 3/27, and then having heard your interview on KPBS 4/2, and still forming Department of Homeland IN-Security, I'm forwarding TWO DISTINCT pieces of information for you to use as you see fit. My "trust" in relevant Federal police/intelligence agencies, as most American's after 9/11 (in which my nephew, a Senior V. P. on Wall Street, almost died!) is ABSOLUTE ZERO!

 

Why? For example, just go to the Department of Homeland Security webpage www.dhs.gov and see how one contacts them. What you'll find is an insultingly short format, no attachments allowed nor encouraged, even cutting and pasting prohibitive. The message is clear: we'll talk at you, but you can not talk too much to us, i. e. what information/knowledge you (the public) have to offer can not possibly be important, certainly is not and could not ever possibly be as important as what WE (the BIG Government "Experts", a.k.a. "Boffins" (in the U. K.)), have to TELL you (even if what you have to say is important) [just like the (especially local!!!) FBI, who could not find two of the 9/11 hijackers in SD because they were very sneakily hiding IN PLAIN SIGHT in the PACIFIC BELL PHONE DIRECTORY!] i. e. " 'business' as usual", a.k.a. CYA (NOT CIA, but CYA) turf media-hype P. R. spin-doctoring turf-wars.

[why I'll bet that if Osamma Bin Ladden tried to call the FBI, or CIA, or SDPD to no avail so many times to surrender that he'd just get so PO'd that he would become even more of a terrorist!; they have problems, like trying to spell out their acronyms (for example, at 9/11 Intelligence Failures Congressional hearings, I and everyone else distinctly heard FBI being spelled out as FIB, and CIA being spelled out as CYA, etc.

In fact it doesn't seem to matter just what acronym these government agencies might try to hide behind: CIA (actually the most receptive over the years, so I don't wish to pick on them especially!), DNA/DASA, FBI, DHS, DOE, NRC,...; they all always to come out as being spelled CYA!!!]

 

At any rate, please consider both distinct Part 1 & Part 2 information for you to use as appropriate.

 

Please don't hesitate to contact me if you have any questions, or if I can be of any further assistance!

 

 

Most Respectfully,

 

Dr. Edward Siegel

Physicist/Metallurgist

(858) 270-5111

 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                     PART ONE

            NUCLEAR REACTORS,...

                     "accidents"

        WAITING TO HAPPEN!!!

 

re; possible Nuclear Reactors Power Plant DHS terrorism alert(S):

 

Introduction:

 

I'm a longtime nuclear industry whistleblower metallurgist and physicist who worked at Westinghouse, then P. S. E. & G. (large

N. J. utiity) and then the I. A. E. A. in the 1970's, when most of today's nuclear reactors were designed, fabricated and built! Thus, "today's" nuclear reactors are not just AGEING today, "now", but ALREADY ageD!!! (PAST tense!!!), hence ALREADY VERY BRITTLE!!!

(translation: just like an old woman's bones with osteoporosis, " 'they'/their subsystems' components will break open as easily as/like "eggshells" when struck sharply!!!)

(such as in a possible terrorist attack)

 

The ACHILLES HEEL of a nuclear reactor power plant is NOT the concrete containment vessel, BUT the ALREADY EMBRITTLED steam/water wrought (so MIScalled) "super"alloys PIPING and STEAM GENERATORS and their WELDS,

MUCH/MOST of them being situated OUTside that concrete containment vessel bulding surrounding the pressure vessel (also ALRADY EMBRITTLED within it (see Federal Register NRC warning document below))!

 

Despite the media-hype P. R. spin-doctoring nonsense one hears from original reactor fabricators, utility licensee users, the DoE and the NRC, were a terrorist to try to attack such a reactor, these ALREADY EMBRITTLED components/systems OUTside that concrete containment vessel bulding could/would be THE PRIME target of opportunity!

 

Thus these ALREADY EMBRITTLED steam/water PIPES and STEAM GENERATORS situated OUTside the concrete containment building are THE PRIME target(s) for any possible terrorist attack, and should be defended MORE SECURELY that the relatively impervious concrete containment building!!!

 

And do NOT trust the supposed "veracity" of relevant Federal Agencies' (NRC, DOE, ...) and/or utilities operators/licensees'

platitudes about the safety and security of their particular nuclear reactor power plants against possible terrorist attacks. As their sorry history (see below) indicates, [most recent being the Davis-Bessie Ohio near catastrophe last Spring -see Federal Register NRC warning to all PWR utility operators/licensees several years too late!!!] they are at best not up to date on two decades old warnings, and at worst incompetent and in total denial at this GENERIC ENDEMIC (so MIScalled) "super"alloy embrittlement problem for even running their reactors safely EVEN WHEN NO TERRORIST THREAT EXISTED!!! 

 

But with post 9/11 hopefully increased cautions, now exacerbated by the current Iraqi war and even ever more fanatical Muslim/Arab virulent hate for and desire to strike back at the West, and most especially at the U. S., for ALREADY EMBRITTLED nuclear reactor power plants, MOST ESPECIALLY their concrete containment building EXTERIOR PIPING and STEAM GENERATORS, the DHS threat level should be ALWAYS VERY VERY RED!!!

 

(see below technical details, including recent NRC Federal Register alert to reactor operating licensee utilities re this, with my pithy critical comments, and a list of corroborating experts, most right near you in the Washington D. C. area!)

 

Alarmist?

 

Well maybe. But then I did NOT write nor insert the (below) Federal Register warning to all PWR utilities licensees/operators over a problem identified by myself and many others (see technical expert corroborators list and contact information below). It was the NRC, only "a tad late" (certainly for Oconee and Davis Bessie), perhaps some 25 years late! And, even with that lead time, NRC STILL got it WRONG!!! (as my [BOLD ITALICIZED RED-FONT] highlighted comments below within the NRC's Federal Register warning document) detail, perhaps in too technical details for the layperson, but VERY NECESSARY!!!

 

Summarizing them all in one simple nutshell:

ALREADY EMBRITTLED PIPING AND STEAM GENERATORS OUTside concrete containment vessel buildings could/would be PRIME TERRORIST TARGETS!!!

 

Period!

 

And do not let any fancy utility/NRC/DOE/... language and rhetoric to the contrary overly technical to confuse nor buffalo you!

(as witness in their NRC Federal Register warning (below), where they call flanges, connectors between different regions (like one's mouth's lips) by the word "nozzles", which in English means to spray outwards. With their ALREADY EMBRITTLED (so MIScalled) "super"alloys, calling them "nozzles" can/is/has already without the possibility of terrorist attack, not to mention that possibility since 9/11, especially now and for the forseeable future, could become a self fulfilling prophesy!

(translation: when a flange becomes a "nozzle", one is in deep trouble, as witness the symptoms of severe nausea!)

 

The science can be summarized in simple analogy to heating up a pizza in a microwave, even at low temperature setting, and watching it harden: "TIME AT TEMPERATURE". These reactors have had a quarter of a century to embritle, and embrittle they ALREADY HAVE!!! (PAST tense!!!), with ALREADY VERY SEVERE "osteoporosis"!!!

 

A very helpful layman's book for background on the subject from the 1970's is the 1979 "Nuclear Power: From Physics to Politics" by well known environmental journalist Lawrence Pringle, (who can be contacted at (845) 623-7275 or octopushug@aol.com), or environmental investigative reporter Keith Snow (lilyfairies@hotmail.com or either (978) 724-3448 or messaages c/o (413) 634-5088) who stalked me back East about this in the early to mid 1990's and has voluminous documents and video footage about this GENERIC ENDEMIC nuclear safety problem!!!

 

(Technically, you might want to look up ANY/ALL strongly corroborating NRC/DOE reports by Robert Lofaro, from Brookhaven National Laboratory, an excerpt from one with his statistical conclusions from INPO raw data judging the effects of all types of ageing on nuclear system/subsystem/component circa 72%"UNavailability" versus other causes, from the "Nineteenth Light Water Reactor Safety Conference" circa early 1990's, published in a journal called Failure Analysis circa 1992.

 

Professor Herman Chernoff, (emeritus from: Stanford, MIT, Harvard and arguably the world's most famous statistician, and former early on AEC reactor consultant) can detail from you his inability for some three years of requests to get Lofaro's unclassified reports from Brookhaven National Laboratoty/NRC/DOE, and his VERY NEGATIVE technical opinion about ANY/ALL "fault tree analysis", which the NRC/DOE and (God help us!!!) variois Federal Anti-Terrorism/Counter-Intelligence agencies are or might be foolish enough to believe in, quoting him about generic endemic "Fault Tree Analyses" in general:

"wishful thinking, at best, based upon the Achilles Heel of long-tailed distributions, resulting in pure overparametrized fantasy".

(he can be reached at chernoff@stat.harvard.edu, office: (617) 495-5462, home: (617) 232-8256)

 

Please feel free to contact me if I can be of any help in this matter!

 

 

Most Respectfully,

 

Dr. Edward Siegel

 

(858) 270-5111

[NO voicemail; NO call-waiting;often online on dialup;

typical hours until 3/31 (thereafter may change due to local university involvement):

BEST (PACIFIC-time): (until 3/31, then schedule may change somewhat!?)

weekdays: t < 1:00 PM - ~2:00 PM; t > ~ 4:00 PM - ~ 5:30 PM; t = ~ 6:30 PM - ~ 7:00 PM;

weekends: t < ~ 11:00 AM - ~ 12:00 PM - ~ 1:00 PM; t > ~ 4:00 PM - ~ 5:00 PM (depending upon recreational plans)]

 

(P. S.

Lastly, I read (L. A. Times, I believe) in 2002 that the Manager of Metallurgy at San Onofre was an Egyptian Muslim,

who knew the Egyptian who shot up the L. A. Intenational Airport El Al ticket counter.

 

While not wanting to be politically incorrect, one might notice that no ministers, prients nor rabbis were flying those planes into those buildings on 9/11! A word to the wise...!!!)

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

A KNOWLEDGEABLE CORRECTION TO THIS NRC FEDERAL REGISTER DOCUMENT (see below) SHOW HOW UN-KNOWLEDGABLE/STUPID/COVERING UP/FRAUDULENT/SELF-DELUDING/BEHIND TE TIMES THE NRC/DOE REALLY ARE VIS A VIS (so MIScalled) NUCLEAR SAFETY!!!

 

IT'S LIKE A DAISY-CHAIN: ROOT-CAUSE ULTIMATE ORIGIN HIV, CAUSING RESULTING AIDS, CAUSING RESULTING CATASTROPHIC FAILURE, A.K.A. DEATH.

THE ROOT-CAUSE ULTIMATE-ORIGIN IS:

WIGNER'S-DISEASE/OVERAGEING-EMBRITTLEMENT/OSTWALD-RIPENING/SPINODAL-DECOMPOSITION/THERMAL-LEADING-TO-MECHANICAL (TLTM)-INSTABILITY/"SENSITIZATION"

(DECIDEDLY NOT SITTING AROUND A CAMPFIRE TOASTING MARSHMALLOWS, HUGGING TREES AND SINGING "KUMBAYA"), BUT GENERIC ENDEMIC MULTI-DECADE LONG-TIME NUCLEAR-INDUSTRY((SO M I S CALLED "SUPER"-ALLOY SUPPLIERS: INCO, HAYNES, CABOT, ELGIN, ...); COMPONENTS FABRICATORS, ARCHITECT/ENGINEERS, UTILITIES/LICENSEES, NRC,DOE (AEC, ERDA,...), EPRI, INPO, NATIONAL LABORATORIES (BNL, ORNL, ANL, LANL, LLNL)

F R A U D!!!

 

Critique inserted into text IN  [RED HIGHLIGHTED BOLD ITALICS IN CAPITALS]

 

Dr. Edward Siegel

Metallurgist/Physicist/Whistleblower

Fired, Westin"KL"ouse Atomic Power Div./Nuc"EL"ar Energy Systems, Senior Metallurgist/Materials Scientist (1974)

Fired, P. S. E. & G. (N. J. utility), Manager/Metallurgy and Non-Destructive Testing (NDT/E) (1976)

Fired, I. A. E. A. (by Directors General Eckstrom & HANS BLIX), International Nuclear Metallurgy/Materials Consultant (1977)

[see: Ana Mayo, "If Leaks Could Kill", The Village Voice, p. 40 (8/21/78);

E. Siegel, Jnl. of Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 7, 312 (1978)]

[Do google search on "Edward Siegel" and see especially anti-nuc"EL"ar website www.animatedsoftware.com website and "Alloy 600"]

(see very end of this document!)

messages c/o (858) 270-5111

tat@tnl-online.com

 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

> > >   12 NRC: Immediate order modifying PWR licenses

> > >

> > > FR Doc 03-3835

> > >

> > > [Federal Register: February 18, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 32)]

> > > [Notices] [Page 7806-7810] From the Federal Register Online via

> > > GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr18fe03-81]

> > >

> > > NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

> > > [Docket Nos. (as shown in Attachment 1), License Nos. (as shown

> > > in Attachment 1) EA-03-009]

> > >

> > > In the Matter of: All Pressurized Water Reactor Licensees;

             Order Modifying Licenses (Effective Immediately) I

> > >

> > > The Licensees identified in the Attachment to this Order hold

> > > licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or

> > > Commission) authorizing operation of pressurized water reactor

> > > (PWR) nuclear power plants in accordance with the Atomic Energy

> > > Act of 1954 and 10 CFR part 50. II

> > >

> > > The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) heads of PWRs have penetrations

> > > for control rod drive mechanisms and instrumentation systems.

> > > Nickel- based alloys (e.g., Alloy 600) are used in the

> > > penetration nozzles and related welds[NO, INCO-182/82 TRANSITION-WELD "FILLER-METAL" IS USED; INCONEL-600 IS A WROUGHT ALLOY!!!]. Primary coolant water and

> > > the operating conditions of PWR plants can cause cracking of

> > > these nickel-based alloys through a process called primary water

> > > stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC).[BUT N O T THE ROOT-CAUSE ULTIMATE-ORIGIN, MERELY AN EFFECT, ONE OF SEVERAL EFFECTS POSSIBLE, LIKE LINKS COMPETING TO BREAK A CHAIN. WHICH LINK WINS?THE WEAKEST!]The susceptibility of RPV head

> > > penetrations to PWSCC appears to be strongly linked to the

> > > operating time and[AT!!!] temperature of the RPV head. Problems related

> > > to PWSCC have therefore increased as plants have operated for

> > > longer periods of time[A.K.A. AGEING, ACCELERATED DRASTICALLY IN OVER-AGEING!!!]. Inspections of the RPV head nozzles[WHY DO THEY CALL THEM "NOZZLES"? A "NOZZLE" IS SUPPOSED TO SPRAY SOMETHING FROM INSIDE SOME SORT OF CONTAINER TO ITS OUTSIDE, THE LAST THINK ONE WANTS WITH A NUCLEAR REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL. THE WORD IS F L A N G E!!! OF COURSE, WITH THE VARIOUS "NOZZLE" CRACKING PROBLEMS: DAVIS-BESSIE, TEPCO IN JAPAN, EC(1/14/92 ROLLNICK FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN THE EUROPEAN ,..., IT SEEMS THIS NAME "NOZZLES" FOR FLANGES HAS BECOME A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHESY!!!] at

> > > the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3 (Oconee), in early 2001

> > > identified circumferential cracking of the nozzles above the

> > > J-groove weld[INCO-182/82!!!], which joins the nozzle to the RPV head.

> > > Circumferential cracking above the J-groove weld is a safety

> > > concern because of the possibility of a nozzle ejection if the

> > > circumferential cracking is not detected and repaired.

> > >

> > > Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler

> > > and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), which is incorporated into

> > > NRC regulations by 10 CFR 50.55a, ``Codes and standards,''

> > > currently specifies that inspections of the RPV head need only

> > > include a visual check for leakage on the insulated surface or

> > > surrounding area. These inspections may not detect small amounts

> > > of leakage from an RPV head penetration with cracks extending

> > > through the nozzle or the J-groove weld. Such leakage can create

> > > an environment that leads to circumferential cracks in RPV head

> > > penetration nozzles or corrosion of the RPV head. In response to

> > > the inspection findings at Oconee and because existing

> > > requirements in the ASME Code and NRC regulations do not

> > > adequately address inspections of RPV head penetrations for

> > > degradation due to PWSCC, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-01,

> > > ``Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

> > > Penetration Nozzles,'' dated August 3, 2001. In response to the

> > > Bulletin, PWR Licensees provided their plans for inspecting RPV

> > > head penetrations and the outside surface of the heads to

> > > determine whether any nozzles were leaking.

> > >

> > > In early March 2002, while conducting inspections of reactor

> > > vessel head penetrations prompted by Bulletin 2001-01, the

> > > Licensee for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse)

> > > identified a cavity in the reactor vessel head near the top of

> > > the dome. The cavity was next to a leaking nozzle [[Page 7807]]

> > > with a through-wall axial crack and was in an area of the reactor

> > > vessel head that the Licensee had left covered with boric acid

> > > deposits for several years. On March 18, 2002, the NRC issued

> > > Bulletin 2002-01, ``Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and

> > > Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,'' which requested

> > > PWR Licensees to provide information on their reactor vessel head

> > > inspection and maintenance programs, the material condition of

> > > their reactor vessel heads, and their boric acid inspection

> > > programs. In their responses, the Licensees provided information

> > > about their boric acid inspection programs and their inspections

> > > and assessments to ensure that their respective plant did not

> > > have reactor vessel head degradation like that identified at

> > > Davis-Besse.

> > >

> > > The experience at Davis-Besse and the discovery of leaks and

> > > nozzle cracking at other plants reinforced the need for more

> > > effective inspections of RPV head penetration nozzles. The

> > > absence of an effective inspection regime could, over time,

> > > result in unacceptable circumferential cracks in RPV head

> > > penetration nozzles or in the degradation of the RPV head by

> > > corrosion. These degradation mechanisms increase the probability

> > > of a more significant loss of reactor coolant pressure boundary

> > > through ejection of a nozzle or other rupture of the RPV head.

> > > The NRC issued Bulletin 2002-02, ``Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

> > > and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection Programs,'' dated

> > > August 9, 2002, requesting that Licensees provide information

> > > about their inspection programs and any plans to supplement

> > > existing visual inspections with additional measures (e.g.,

> > > volumetric and surface examinations). Licensees have responded to

> > > Bulletin 2002-02 with descriptions of their inspection plans for

> > > at least the first refueling outage following the issuance of

> > > Bulletin 2002-02 or with a schedule to submit such descriptions

> > > before the next refueling outage. Many of the Licensees'

> > > responses to Bulletin 2002-02 did not describe long-term

> > > inspection plans. Instead the Licensees stated that they would

> > > follow guidance being developed by the industry-sponsored

> > > Materials Reliability Program.

> > >

> > > Inspections performed at several[ONLY "SEVERAL"???; HOW ABOUT A N Y / A L L???!!!] PWR plants in late 2002 found

> > > leakage and cracks in nozzles or J-groove welds that have

> > > required repairs or prompted the replacement of the RPV head. In

> > > addition, as discussed in NRC Information Notice 2003-02,

> > > ``Recent Experience with Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Boric

> > > Acid Corrosion,'' issued January 16, 2003, leakage has recently

> > > occurred at some plants from connections above the RPV head and

> > > has required additional assessments and inspections to ensure

> > > that the leakage has not caused significant degradation of RPV

> > > heads. III

> > >

> > > Based on recent experience, current inspection requirements in

> > > the ASME Code and related NRC regulations do not provide adequate

> > > assurance that reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity will

> > > be maintained for all combinations of construction materials,

> > > operating conditions, and operating histories at PWRs. The

> > > long-term resolution of RPV head penetration inspection

> > > requirements is expected to involve changes to the ASME Code and

> > > NRC regulations, specifically 10 CFR 50.55a. Research being

> > > conducted by the NRC and industry is increasing our understanding

> > > of material performance, improving inspection capabilities, and

> > > supporting assessments of the risks to public health and safety

> > > associated with potential degradation of the RPV head and

> > > associated penetration nozzles. These research activities are

> > > important to the long term development of revisions to the ASME

> > > Code and NRC regulations.

> > >

> > > The operating history of PWRs supports a general correlation

> > > among certain operating parameters, including the length of time

> > > plants have been in operation, and the likelihood of occurrence

> > > of PWSCC of nickel- based alloys used in RPV head penetration

> > >nozzles. Bulletin 2002-02 presented a three-tier categorization

> > > of susceptibility to RPV head penetration nozzle degradation

> > > based on reactor operating durations and temperatures. Licensees'

> > > responses to the Bulletin included an estimate of the effective

> > > degradation years (EDY) and the appropriate categorization of

> > > each plant into one of the three susceptibility categories. Each

> > > Licensee proposed an inspection plan for RPV head penetrations

> > > based upon the susceptibility to degradation via PWSCC (as

> > > represented by the value of EDY calculated for the facility). In

> > > addition, recent operating experience has shown that, under

> > > certain conditions, leakage from mechanical and welded

> > > connections above the RPV head can lead to the degradation of the

> > > low alloy steel head by boric acid corrosion.

> > >

> > > Revising the ASME Code and subsequently the NRC regulations will

> > > take several years. The Licensees' actions to date in response to

> > > the NRC bulletins have provided reasonable assurance of adequate

> > > protection of public health and safety for the near term

> > > operating cycles, but cannot be relied upon to do so for the

> > > entire interim period until NRC regulations are revised.

> > > Additional periodic inspections of RPV heads and associated

> > > penetration nozzles at PWRs, as a function of the unit's

> > > susceptibility to PWSCC and as appropriate to address the

> > > discovery of boron deposits, are necessary to provide reasonable

> > > assurance that plant operations do not pose an undue risk to the

> > > public health and safety. Consequently, it is necessary to

> > > establish a minimum set of RPV head inspection requirements, as a

> > > supplement to existing inspection and other requirements in the

> > > ASME Code and NRC regulations, through the issuance of an Order

> > > to PWR Licensees.

> > >

> > > It is appropriate and necessary to the protection of public

> > > health and safety to establish a clear regulatory framework,

> > > pending the development of consensus standards and incorporation

> > > of revised inspection requirements into 10 CFR 50.55a, directly

> > > or through reference to a future version of the ASME Code. In

> > > order to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of

> > > public health and safety for the interim period, all PWR Licenses

> > > identified in the Attachment to this Order shall be modified to

> > > include the inspection requirements for RPV heads and associated

> > > penetration nozzles identified in Section IV of this Order. The

> > > NRC requirements imposed by this Order are based on the body of

> > > evidence available through February 2003. Continuing research and

> > > operating experience may support future changes to the

> > > requirements imposed through this Order. In addition, pursuant to

> > > 10 CFR 2.202, I find that in the circumstances described above,

> > > the public health, safety, and interest require that this Order

> > > be immediately effective. IV

> > >

> > > Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104b, 161b, 161i, 161o,

> > > 182, and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and

> > > the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR part 50,

> > > it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that all licenses

> > > identified in the attachment to this order are modified as

> > > follows:

> > >

> > > A. To determine the required inspection(s) for each refueling

> > > outage at their facility, all Licensees shall calculate the

> > > susceptibility category of each reactor vessel head to

> > > PWSCC-related degradation, as represented by a value of EDY for

> > > the end of each operating cycle, using the following equation:

> > > [[Page 7808]]

> > >

> > > [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN18FE03.013

> > >

> > > Where: EDY = total effective degradation years, normalized to a

> > > reference temperature of 600 [deg]F [Delta]EFPYj = operating time

> > > in years at Thead,j Qi = activation energy for crack initiation

> > > (50 kcal/mole) R = universal gas constant (1.103x10-3

> > > kcal/mole[deg]R) Thead,j = 100% power head temperature during

> > > time period j ([deg]R = [deg]F + 459.67) Tref = reference

> > > temperature (600 [deg]F = 1059.67 [deg]R) n = number of different

> > > head temperatures during plant history

> > >

> > > This calculation shall be performed with best estimate values for

> > > each parameter at the end of each operating cycle for the RPV

> > > head that will be in service during the subsequent operating

> > > cycle. The calculated value of EDY shall determine the

> > > susceptibility category and the appropriate inspection for the

> > > RPV head during each refueling outage.

> > >

> > > B. All Licensees shall use the following criteria to assign the

> > > RPV head at their facility to the appropriate PWSCC

> > > susceptibility category: High--(1) Plants with a calculated value

> > > of EDY greater than 12, OR (2) Plants with an RPV head that has

> > > experienced cracking in a penetration nozzle or J-groove weld due

> > > to PWSCC. Moderate--Plants with a calculated value of EDY less

> > > than or equal to 12 and greater than or equal to 8 AND no

> > > previous inspection findings requiring classification as High.

> > > Low--Plants with a calculated value of EDY less than 8 AND no

> > > previous inspection findings requiring classification as High.

> > >

> > > C. All Licensees shall perform inspections of the RPV head

> > > \1\ using the following techniques and frequencies.\2\

> > >

> > >

> > > \1\ This Order imposes additional inspection requirements.

> > > Licensees are required to address any findings from these

> > > inspections (i.e., perform analyses and repairs) in accordance

> > > with existing requirements in the ASME Code and 10 CFR 50.55a.

> > > The NRC has issued guidance to address flaw evaluations for RPV

> > > head penetration nozzles (see letter dated November 21, 2001,

> > > from J. Strosnider, NRC, to A. Marion, Nuclear Energy Institute)

> > > and will, as necessary, issue revised guidance pending the

> > > updating of the ASME Code and related NRC regulations.

> > >

> > > \2\ The requirements of this Order are generally consistent with

> > > inspection plans that the NRC staff accepted in letters to some

> > > Licensees regarding their responses to Bulletin 2002-02. If the

> > > NRC staff has already accepted a specific variation from the

> > > requirements of this Order (e.g., inspections to less than two

> > > (2) inches above the J-groove weld), the Licensee may continue

> > > with the previously accepted inspection plan for the next

> > > refueling outage after issuance of this Order, provided that in

> > > its response to this Order the Licensee identifies all

> > > discrepancies between the requirements of this Order and the

> > > previously accepted inspection plan. Licensees proposing to

> > > deviate from the requirements of this Order for subsequent

> > > refueling outages shall seek relaxation of this Order pursuant to

> > > the procedure specified at the end of this Section.

> > >

> > > (1) For those plants in the High category, RPV head and head

> > > penetration nozzle inspections shall be performed using the

> > > following techniques every refueling outage.\3\

> > >

> > >

> > > \3\ For repaired RPV head penetration nozzles that establish a

> > > new pressure boundary, the ultrasonic testing inspection shall

> > > include the weld and at least one (1) inch above the weld in the

> > > nozzle base material. For RPV head penetration nozzles or

> > > J-groove welds repaired using a weld overlay, the overlay shall

> > > be examined by either ultrasonic, eddy current, or dye penetrant

> > > testing in addition to the examinations required by (1)(b)(i) or

> > > (1)(b)(ii).

> > >

> > > (a) Bare metal visual examination of 100% of the RPV head surface

> > > (including 360[deg] around each RPV head penetration nozzle), AND

> > >

> > > (b) Either:

> > >

> > > (i) Ultrasonic testing of each RPV head penetration nozzle (i.e.,

> > > nozzle base material) from two (2) inches above the J-groove weld

> > > to the bottom of the nozzle and an assessment to determine if

> > > leakage has occurred into the interference fit zone, OR

> > >

> > > (ii) Eddy current[CAN'T WORK SINCE (SO MISCALLED) "SUPER"ALLOYS GET FERROMAGNETIC DURING THEIR WIGNER'S-DISEASE/OVERAGEING-EMBRITTLEMENT/OSTWALD-RIPENING/SPINODAL-DECOMPOSITION/ "SENSITIZATION" !!! (SEE E. Siegel: Intl. Conf. on Magnetic Alloys and Oxides, The Technion, Haifa, Israel (1977); published in: Jnl. Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 7, 312 (1978)] testing or dye penetrant testing of the wetted

> > > surface of each J-Groove weld and RPV head penetration nozzle

> > > base material to at least two (2) inches above the J-groove weld.

> > >

> > > (2) For those plants in the Moderate category, RPV head and head

> > > penetration inspections shall be performed such that at least the

> > > requirements of 2(a) or 2(b) are performed each refueling outage.

> > > In addition the requirements of 2(a) and 2(b) shall each be

> > > performed at least once over the course of every two (2)

> > > refueling outages.

> > >

> > > (a) Bare metal visual examination of 100% of the RPV head surface

> > > (including 360[deg] around each RPV head penetration nozzle).

> > >

> > > (b) Either:

> > >

> > > (i) Ultrasonic testing of each RPV head penetration nozzle (i.e.,

> > > nozzle base material) from two (2) inches above the J-groove weld

> > > to the bottom of the nozzle and an assessment to determine if

> > > leakage has occurred into the interference fit zone, OR

> > >

> > > (ii) Eddy current[CAN'T WORK SINCE (SO MISCALLED) "SUPER"ALLOYS GET FERROMAGNETIC DURING THEIR WIGNER'S-DISEASE/OVERAGEING-EMBRITTLEMENT/OSTWALD-RIPENING/SPINODAL-DECOMPOSITION/ "SENSITIZATION" !!! (SEE E. Siegel: Intl. Conf. on Magnetic Alloys and Oxides, The Technion, Haifa, Israel (1977); published in: Jnl. Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 7, 312 (1978)]  testing or dye penetrant testing of the wetted

> > > surface of each J-Groove weld and RPV head penetration nozzle

> > > base material to at least two (2) inches above the J-groove weld.

> > >

> > > (3) For those plants in the Low category, RPV head and head

> > > penetration nozzle inspections shall be performed as follows. An

> > > inspection meeting the requirements of 3(a) must be completed at

> > > least every third refueling outage or every five (5) years,

> > > whichever occurs first. If an inspection meeting the requirements

> > > of 3(a) was not performed during the refueling outage immediately

> > > preceding the issuance of this Order, the Licensee must complete

> > > an inspection meeting the requirements of 3(a) within the first

> > > two (2) refueling outages following issuance of this Order. The

> > > requirements of 3(b) must be completed at least once over the

> > > course of five (5) years after the issuance of this Order and

> > > thereafter at least every four (4) refueling outages or every

> > > seven (7) years, whichever occurs first.

> > >

> > > (a) Bare metal visual examination of 100% of the RPV head surface

> > > (including 360[deg] around each RPV head penetration nozzle).

> > >

> > > (b) Either:

> > >

> > > (i) Ultrasonic testing of each RPV head penetration nozzle (i.e.,

> > > nozzle base material) from two (2) inches above the J-groove weld

> > > to the bottom of the nozzle and an assessment to determine if

> > > leakage has occurred into the interference fit zone, or

> > >

> > > (ii) Eddy current[CAN'T WORK SINCE (SO MISCALLED) "SUPER"ALLOYS GET FERROMAGNETIC DURING THEIR WIGNER'S-DISEASE/OVERAGEING-EMBRITTLEMENT/OSTWALD-RIPENING/SPINODAL-DECOMPOSITION/ "SENSITIZATION" !!! (SEE E. Siegel: Intl. Conf. on Magnetic Alloys and Oxides, The Technion, Haifa, Israel (1977); published in: Jnl. Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 7, 312 (1978)]  testing or dye penetrant testing of the wetted

> > > surface of each J-Groove weld and RPV head penetration nozzle

> > > base material to at least two (2) inches above the J-groove weld.

> > >

[SIMPLE MAGNETIZATION &/or MAGNETIC-SUSCEPTIBILITY MEASUREMENTS (Prof. ARROTT is THE WORLD'S GREATEST EXPERT ON SUCH MEASUREMENTS; DRS. SWARTZENDRUBER (& BENNETT) DID SOME OF THE WORK PUBLISHED IN MY 1978-1977 PAPER QUOTED HEREIN!) WOULD WORK JUST FINE, {SINCE (SO MISCALLED) "SUPER"ALLOYS GET STRONGLY FERROMAGNETIC DURING THEIR WIGNER'S-DISEASE/OVERAGEING-EMBRITTLEMENT/ OSTWALD-RIPENING/SPINODAL-DECOMPOSITION/ "SENSITIZATION" !!! (see my paper: E. Siegel: Intl. Conf. on Magnetic Alloys and Oxides, The Technion, Haifa, Israel (1977); published in: Jnl. Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 7, 312 (1978)-ESPECIALLY F I R S T PAGE!!!}. I SUGGEST ON  THESE EMBRITTLED/CRACKED (SO MISCALLED) "SUPER"ALLOYS (BUT, IT, BEING SO CHEAP AND EASY, SHOULD HAVE BEEN (PAST TENSE!!!) DONE CONTINUOUSLY BEFORE THEY CRACKED; NOW IT'S TOO LATE BECAUSE THERE IS N O WAY TO REPAIR A CRACK!!) THE "VERY ADVANCED" "HIGH-TECH" "BREUGERS BAGEL-OMETER" TEST(but of course te NRC never could/would simply because they still, after denying my two complaints to their inspector-general over this FRAUD, simply haveN'T a CLUE about what is REALLY going on, still blaming it on (it's like saying something "broke simply because it broke" (i. e. the patient with HIV leading to AIDS who died of, say TB,, "died because he contracted TB".With HIV caused AIDS lowering his immune system, he would have died of something eventually among the competing diseases in the environment one is exposed to; it's like the question: "which link breaks a chain", with common sense answer "the weakest"); a tautology that teaches you and show's that you've/THE N. R. C. has learned absolutely nothing!!!); a BRUEGERS BAGEL (horrible bagels if you're from Brooklyn or New York City and especially if you're Jewish; they're merely white bread with a hole in the middle; you could not give them away for free to welfare recipients in New York!!!) "STICK-ON\" (LIKE A REFRIGERATOR STICK-ON FOR NOTES/MESSAGES) IS HELD AGAINST A FLAT SURFACE OF THE (SO MISCALLED) "SUPER"ALLOY IN THE REACTOR; IF IT FALLS OFF, O. K. (PROBABLY N O PROBLEM, Y E T!); IF IT STICKS (OR YOUR (QUITE SENSITIVE)) FINGERTIPS HOLDING THE "STICK ON" FEEL A MAGNETIC FORCE), THEN DO A LOCAL MICROHARDNESS TEST (KNOOP, VICKERS,...) TO SEE IF IT IS HARDENED ABOVE WHAT IT SHOULD BE (a. k. a. embrittled; usually harder things are more brittle!), ("OPTIONAL": THEN DO A CHEMISTRY QUANTITATIVE-ANALYSIS TO MAKE SURE IT'S THE CORRECT (SO MISCALLED) "SUPER"ALLOY,SINCE MOST METALS/ALLOYS ARE SILVERY-GREY, AND YOU'D BE SURPRISED (BUT SHOULDN'T BE!!!) AT HOW THE W R O N G  ALLOYS CAN BE AND TOO OFTEN ARE USED IN FABRICATION/CONSTRUCTION, ESPECIALLY THE (SO MISCALLED) "SUPER"ALLOYS IN NUCLEAR-REACTORS; JET-ENGINES; MISSILE ENGINES, REFINERIES; CHEMICAL-PLANTS, ... !!!]  

> > > D. During each refueling outage, visual inspections shall be

> > > performed to identify potential boric acid leaks from pressure-

> > > retaining components above the RPV head. For any plant with boron

> > > deposits on the surface of the RPV head or related insulation,

> > > discovered either during the inspections required by this Order

> > > or otherwise and regardless of the source of the deposit, before

> > > returning the plant to operation the Licensee shall perform

> > > inspections of the affected RPV head surface and penetrations

> > > appropriate to the conditions found to verify the integrity of

> > > the affected area and penetrations. [[Page 7809]]

> > >

> > > E. For each inspection required in Paragraph C, the Licensee

> > > shall submit a report detailing the inspection results within

> > > sixty (60) days after returning the plant to operation.\4\ For

> > > each inspection required in Paragraph D, the Licensee shall

> > > submit a report detailing the inspection results within sixty

> > > (60) days after returning the plant to operation if a leak or

> > > boron deposit was found during the inspection.

> > >

> > >

> > > \4\ This reporting requirement supercedes the 30-day reports

> > > requested by NRC Bulletin 2002-02.

> > >

> > > F. In the response required by Section V of this Order, all

> > > Licensees shall notify the Commission if: (1) They are unable to

> > > comply with any of the requirements of Section IV, or (2)

> > > compliance with any of the requirements of Section IV is

> > > unnecessary. Licensees proposing to deviate from the requirements

> > > of this Order shall seek relaxation of this Order pursuant to the

> > > procedure specified below.

> > >

> > > The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, may, in

> > > writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon

> > > demonstration by the Licensee of good cause. A request for

> > > relaxation regarding inspection of specific nozzles shall also

> > > address the following criteria:

> > >

> > > (1) The proposed alternative(s) for inspection of specific

> > > nozzles will provide an acceptable level of quality and safety,

> > > or

> > >

> > > (2) Compliance with this Order for specific nozzles would result

> > > in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase

> > > in the level of quality and safety.

> > >

> > > Requests for relaxation associated with specific penetration

> > > nozzles will be evaluated by the NRC staff using its procedure

> > > for evaluating proposed alternatives to the ASME Code in

> > > accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3). V

> > >

> > > In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other

> > > person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to

> > > this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within

> > > twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Where good cause is

> > > shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to

> > > request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to

> > > submit an answer or request a hearing must be made in writing to

> > > the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear

> > > Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a

> > > statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may consent

> > > to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the

> > > answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation,

> > > specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which the

> > > Licensee or other person adversely affected relies and the

> > > reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. Any

> > > answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the

> > > Secretary, Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

> > > Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and

> > > Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies shall also be

> > > sent to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.

> > > Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555; to the

> > > Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and

> > > Enforcement at the same address; to the Regional Administrator

> > > for NRC Region I, II, III, or IV, as appropriate for the specific

> > > plant; and to the Licensee if the answer or hearing request is by

> > > a person other than the Licensee. Because of possible disruptions

> > > in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is

> > > requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to

> > > the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile

> > > transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to

> > > hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Assistant General Counsel

> > > for Materials Litigation and Enforcement either by means of

> > > facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to

> > > OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than the Licensee

> > > requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with

> > > particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely

> > > affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth

> > > in 10 CFR 2.714(d).\5\

> > >

> > > \5\ The version of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

> > > published January 1, 2002, inadvertently omitted the last

> > > sentence of 10 CFR 2.714 (d) and paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2)

> > > regarding petitions to intervene and contentions. For the

> > > complete, corrected text of 10 CFR 2.714 (d), please see 67 FR

> > > 20884, April 29, 2002.

> > >

> > >

> > > If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose

> > > interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an

> > > Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing

> > > is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be

> > > whether this Order should be sustained.

> > >

> > > Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition

> > > to demanding a hearing at the time the answer is filed or sooner,

> > > move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate

> > > effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order,

> > > including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on

> > > adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations,

> > > or error.

> > >

> > > In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of

> > > an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the

> > > provisions specified in Section IV above shall be final twenty

> > > (20) days from the date of this Order without further order or

> > > proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has

> > > been approved, the provisions specified in Section IV shall be

> > > final when the extension expires if a hearing request has not

> > > been received. An answer or request for hearing shall not stay

> > > the immediate effectiveness of this order.

> > >

> > > Dated this 11th day of February, 2003.

> > >

> > > For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Samuel J. Collins,

> > > Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

> > >

> > > Attachment to Order:

> > > Facilities

> > > Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2[old home week]

> > > Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412

> > > License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73

> > > Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,

> > > Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318

> > > License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69

> > > R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

> > > Docket No. 50-244

> > > License No. DPR-18

> > > Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station,[old home week]

> > > Units 2 and 3

> > > Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50-286

> > > License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64

> > > Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3[old home week]

> > > Docket Nos. 50-336 and 50-423

> > > License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49

> > > Salem Nuclear Generating Station,[old home week!!!]

> > > Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

> > > License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75

> > > Seabrook Station, Unit 1[old home week]

> > > Docket No. 50-443

> > > License No. NPF-86

> > > Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1[old home week]

> > > Docket No. 50-289

> > > License No. DPR-50

> > > Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

> > > License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52

> > > Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant

> > > Docket No. 50-302

> > > License No. DPR-72

> > > Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant,

> > > Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

> > > License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

> > > Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

> > > Docket No. 50-400

> > > License No. NPF-63

> > > William B. McGuire Nuclear Station,

> > > Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

> > > License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

> > > North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339

> > > License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7

> > > [[Page 7810]]

> > > Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281

> > > License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37

> > > Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3[old home week]

> > > Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287

> > > License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55

> > > H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2

> > > Docket No. 50-261

> > > License No. DPR-23

> > > St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389

> > > License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16

> > > Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station,

> > > Units 3 and 4

> > > Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251

> > > License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41

> > > Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

> > > License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79

> > > Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1

> > > Docket No. 50-390

> > > License No. NPF-90

> > > Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1

> > > Docket No. 50-395

> > > License No. NPF-12

> > > Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,

> > > Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

> > > License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

> > > Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457

> > > License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77

> > > Byron Station, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455

> > > License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66

> > > Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316

> > > License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74

> > > Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1[old home week]

> > > Docket No. 50-346

> > > License No. NPF-3

> > > Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

> > > Docket No. 50-305

> > > License No. DPR-43

> > > Palisades Plant

> > > Docket No. 50-255

> > > License No. DPR-20

> > > Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301

> > > License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

> > > Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306

> > > License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60

> > > Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368

> > > License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

> > > Callaway Plant, Unit 1

> > > Docket No. 50-483

> > > License No. NPF-30

> > > Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station,

> > > Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446

> > > License Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89

> > > Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,[old home week]

> > > Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323

> > > License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82

> > > Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1

> > > Docket No. 50-285

> > > License No. DPR-40

> > > Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,

> > > Units 1, 2 and 3

> > > Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529 and

> > > STN 50-530

> > > License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51 and NPF-74

> > > San Onofre Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3[old home week]

> > > Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362

> > > License Nos. NPF-10 and NPF-15

> > > South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

> > > Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499

> > > License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80

> > > Waterford Steam Electric Generating Station, Unit 3

> > > Docket No. 50-382

> > > License No. NPF-38

> > > Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1

> > > Docket No. 50-482

> > > License No. NPF-42

> > > [FR Doc. 03-3835 Filed 2-14-03; 8:45 am]

> > > BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

> >

> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                              The U. S. S. KURSK:

              GENERIC ENDEMIC Navy (

SSN, SSBN, CVN) / Utility

             NUC"EL"AR "ACCIDENTS"/TERRORISTS TARGETS

                      WAITING TO HAPPEN

(Courtesy:

Westin"KL"ouse, G.-E., P. & W./U.-T., A.B.B./C.-E., B. & W., Elgin, Inco, Haynes, Cabot, Prudential..., Morgan/Brown-Louis-Githers-Ahn-…-Ashpahani, Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, and metals/alloys-TRADERS: Perrot, Enron!!!, Andersen!!! …)

                                                                             Dr. E. Siegel"

                                                                              Consultant

                                                              ThermAlloy Technology Ltd. (TAT(L))

                                                                    messages c/o (858) 270-5111

                                                                          tat@tnl-online.com

· very recent Davis-Bessie (a.k.a. "Betty Davis" (sorry Betty!)) B.&W. P.W.R. (with water-temperature @ ~642 F,(a.k.a. "666") simply UNbelievable nuc"EL"ar "accident" WAITING TO HAPPEN (see www.toledoblade.com, Tom Henry (3/12/02, 4/6/02, 4/12/02) and ongoing!!!; www.nirs.org, Front page/March Newsletter: "Millimeters from Catastrophe"; …, M. Wald, New York Times (poor by-rote NRC/DoE-shill coverage)); Keith Brown, on Bill Moyers "Now" (1/24/03)

· very recent Hamaoka I Toshiba- G.-E. B.W.R., Chubu Electric Co. Japan (www.japantimes.com (11/10/01, 11/17/01, 12/26/01) FAILURE of ALL INCO-182/82 transition-welds EXACTLY AS SIEGEL (among many many others!!!) PREDICTED SO LONG AGO!!! (1974-1978) with systematic/systematically ignored by: A.E.C., E.R.D.A., N.R.C., D.o.E. [see: Lawrence Pringle book, "Nuc‘EL’ar Power: From Physics to Politics"(1979)] ; Intl. Conf. on Magnetic Alloys and Oxides, The Technion, Haifa, Israel (8-9/1977); Jnl. Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 7, 31 (1978); Ana Mayo, The Village Voice, p. 40 (8/21/78); Howard French, Tokyo Bureau Chief, The New York Times;…

· very recent Barensbuttel (Germany) P.W.R. and Temlin (Slovakia) P.W.R. ((supposedly)"repaired" by Westin"KL"ouse!!!) - (2001) - see: www.nirs.org (2001); www.japantimes.com(?); …

· recent (5/19/00; Gibraltar/Algericas Bay) H. M. S. Tire"less"d SSN nuclear attack-submarine [Reuters News dispatch: (San Diego Union Tribune, p. 2, 10/22/00) but "amazingly" in no other national U. S. paper: neither: N.Y.T., nor L. A. T., nor W.-P.,...-talk about managed news!!!]; [also: in El Pais (Madrid, Spain major daily (10/31/00) - on WWW) & Fiona Botsford (and Christian Fraser?) on B.B.C. News, [N.P.T.V.; KPBS-Ch.15 (10/31/00), in which Spanish Prime Minister demanded to British Prime Minister that the U.K. "tow it our of Iberian waters forthwith!"], now renamed the H. M. S. "Aged" & Tired) and dry-dock/inspections of whole rest (12) of U.K. SSN nuclear attack-sub fleet, necessitating U. S. Navy guarding of their U. K. whole SSBN nuclear fleet ballistic-missile boats & G.-E.-KAPL core-meltdown diagnosis (518) 587-3245 / Jackshal@aol.com·        plus older French nuclear attack-submarine SSN Emeraud steam-"leak" killing Captain and Nine Crew (Boston Globe, p.25, 3/31/94 ),· plus recent dire warning on Internet by John. P. Shannon and Bob Stater, [G.-E. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) retired Nuclear Engineers, Former Health and Safety Manager, designers of Navy nuclear-reactor cores for some thirty years; @ 262 Jones Rd., Saratoga Springs, N. Y. 12866 / tel: (518) 587-3245 / Jackshal@aol.com] that the H.M.S. Tire"less"d , with no loss-of-coolant (LOC) emergency-core-cooling-system (ECCS) [as do all other nuclear Navy ships of any/all types and any/all countries similarly lack] actually suffered a loss-of-coolant-"accident" (LOCA; "China-Syndrome") on 5/19/00 and is then/ still(?) now(?) stuck powerless and unmovable in Gibraltar/Algereicas Bay, and that ...                                                  · ALL 57 U.S. SSN attack-submarines’ nuclear-reactor cores (which they designed for 30 years) should be as susceptible to and hence suffer similar LOCA "China-Syndrome" problems in the future!!!

·  early unheeded by both nuclear Navy(ies)/commercial nuclear utilities metallurgical dire warnings of (so MIScalled/MISmarketed) "super"alloy generic endemic "Wigner’s-disease"/OVERageing-embrittlement/"Ostwald-ripening" thermal-leading-to-mechanical ("TLTM")-INstability both in-fabrication and or/ in-service problems warnings:

·  (the) Dr. Eugene P. Wigner (he who took Einstei

n’s letter to Roosevelt), Jnl. Applied Physics 17, 857 (1946)

·  Dr. E. Siegel (Metallurgist), Jnl. Magnetism & M

agnetic Materials, 7, 312 (1978) @ Intl. Conf. on Magnetic Alloys and Oxides, (ICMAO), Technion, Haifa, Israel (8-9/1977)

·  Ana Mayo, the Village Voice, "If Leaks Could Kill", Geiger Counter Column, p. 40 (8/21/78)

· Dr. G. Lai, Metallurgical Transactions AIME, 9A, 827 (1978) - especially unbelievable Fig. 2/y-axis!!!)

· Dr. J. R. Kattus, Code # 4112, U. S. DoD Aerospace Structural Materials Handbook, Battelle (1983)

·  Dr. E. Siegel (abstract) 1978 - prediction of Monju, Japan Breeder Reactor nuclear "accident" (Japan Times, front page (12/10-12/95) & thereafter - on WWW in English)

·  E. C. (esp. France & Germany) mandatory commercial nuclear-reactor pressure-vessel heads and cooling piping replacements due to embrittlement-cracking, … (see: R. Rollnick, The European, (1/14/93) front page headlines; Greenpeace Zurich press-releases (~1990’s);…)

·  E. Savage and E. Nippies, Jnl. Welding (1963-67) - many technical papers on "super"alloy welds generic embrittlement

·  Howard Richards(RIP), metallurgist, PSE&G (largest utility/N. J.) suppressed dire multi-decade warnings, suppressed by: P. S. E. & G., A. E. C., E. R. D. A., D. o. E., N. R. C.,…

·  Professor W. B. Pearson, renowned Canadian metallurgist, President (ret.)University of Waterloo - multi-decade dire warnings of generic "super"alloy overageing-embrittlement catastrophic-failures in nuclear power-plants

·  R.M.S.S. TITANIC, (W. Broad, N.Y.T., reprinted in San Diego Union Tribune, p. E2, (2/4/98)) which sank because of (closely related) metallurgical embrittlement of steel bolts and hull plates,...

Warnings, Portents, Continuing / Ongoing Disasters, and Trends are Clear / Undeniable!!!

Do Governments have courage to ACT NOW?

 

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                             CORROBORATING METALLURGISTS/PHYSICISTS/WITNESSES/EXPERTS

 

 

(1) Prof. (ret.) Anthony Arrott (ret.), home: (202) 364-6044 &/or OFTEN with grandchildren in same building

(5026 Reno Road, in D.C.) at (202) 364-6468 (daughter Elizabeth & Russian son-in-law) or via e-mail at:

arrott@vsu.edu  -  HARD AS HELL TO REACH, ALWAYS TRAVELLING!!!

[A KEY CORRABORATOR AND T H E WORLD'S EXPERT ON ALLOY MAGNETISM, THE DEFINING N.D.T. TOOL

I DISCOVERED IN MY Jnl. Mag. Mag. Mtls. 7, 312 (1978) paper that you can get copies of]

 

(2) Dr. Lydon Swartzendruber, Senior Metallurgist, c/o National Institute for Standards & Technology,

U. S. Dept. of Commerce  (N. I. S. T.), 100 Bureau Dr., Gaithersburg, MD.

lydon.swartzendruber@nist.gov, office: (301) 975-6034; home: (301) 577-5559

[MY COWORKER ON THE INCO-182 TRANSITION-WELD "SENSITIZATION" at WESTINGHOUSE & PSE&G]

 

(3) Prof. Larry Bennett, c/o Materials Science & Engineering Dept., George Washington University

office: (703) 776-8299 or  lbennett@gwu.edu, Director, Institute for Magnetics Research, Founder,

National Alloys Database at N.I.S.T. as Lydon Schwartzendruber's boss

 

(4) Dr. Alan Schindler, (301) 770-0232, Bethesda, MD.

[RETIRED CIVILIAN DIRECTOR, NAVAL RESEARCH LAB., D. C. - MAY NOT WANT TO TALK DUE TO ILLNESS &/or NOT WANTING TO REVEAL NAVY/DoD "secrets" to NON-DoD agents!!!???

 

(5) Dr. Kevin Aylesworth (202) 334-2979 or kda@ix.netcom.com,

3906 Red Leaf Ct. Point of Rocks, MD. 21777-9600

[YOUNGER EXPERT IN ALLOY MAGNETISM WHO PARTICIPATED IN MANY DISCUSSIONS WITH ME ABOUT THIS GENERIC ENDEMIC PROBLEM; FORMER SCIENCE POLICY ADVISOR TO SENATOR TOM HARKIN (D-IA)]

 

(6) Prof. (ret.) John (Jack) Gilman, locally in L. A. at U. C. L. A. [renowned expert on mechanical-p[ropertiesof materials who has written a very nice letter to Hoffman about my expertise on (so MIScalled "super"alloy "sensitization"] home: (310) 837-9357 or office (310) 825-9357 or e-mail gilman@seas.ucla.edu

 

(7) Prof. Marvin Antonoff (ret.; U. of MASS Physics Dept Chair; Expert on Metal/Alloy Magnetism)

(781) 862-8174 [LEXINGTON, MA.] marvin.antonoff@umb.edu

NEAR YOU!!!

 

(8) Prof. Wendell Williams (ret.), University of Illinois, Urbana, IL.

w-willms@uiuc.edu; home: (217) 344-5180, 2214 S. Lynn St., Urbana, IL. 61801-6838

Winters try Sarasota, FL. (941) 349-4218, 124 Whispering Sands Drive, Sarasota, FL. 34242

[T  H  E WORLD'S ALL-TIME EXPERT ON CARBIDES WHICH CAUSE THE EMBRITTLEMENT/"SENSITIZATION" ONCE THEY ALIGN IN SHEETS/"CHAINS";MAY NOT WANT TO TALK DUE TO ILLNESS???]

 

(9) Keith Snow (978) 724-3448 or lilyfairies@hotmail.com

NEAR YOU!!!

[ENVIRONMENTAL-JOURNALIST WHO DOCUMENTED WHAT I AM SAYING (VIDEO TAPES) WHILE IN BOSTON, & FORMER MECHANICAL-ENGINEER AT G. E. MISSILE SYSTEMS DIV., SYRACUSE, N.Y., SO HE HAS SOME TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE OF MISSILE ENGINES MECHANICS]]

 

(10) Dr. Albert R. C. Westwood, [ret. Metallurgist, then eventually Exec. V. P. for Research & Technology, Lockheed-Martin Co., Bathesda, MD. - once Director of Research Institute for Advanced Studies, South Rolling Road, Baltimore(?)MD., then Albuquerque, MD. (where he ran Sandia & Oak Ridge National Labs.), may have retired back to U. K.??? - ARROTT MAY KNOW HOW TO CONTACT HIM???

NOT NECESSARILY A FRIENDLY WITNESS!!!???

(11) Howard Whitcombe (Esq.), office: (419) 241-4141; home: (419) 898-4203  right next to Davis-Bessie in Oak Harbor, OH. former "gung ho" Nuclear Navy SSN XO, then NRC and respective utility inspector at Oconee  (S. C.) and Davis Bessie (OH.) quality assurance (QA) inspector turned into whistleblower (for failing to falsify QA documents!), who then became an attorney, now suing First Energy (utility) and NRC, who can detail utility/NRC/DOE ongoing perfidity!

(12) Professor Herman Chernoff,  chernoff@stat.harvard.edu, office: (617) 495-5462, home: (617) 232-8256

(emeritus from: Stanford, MIT, Harvard and arguably the world's most famous statistician, and former early on AEC reactor "safety" consultant) can detail from you his inability for some three years of requests to get Lofaro's unclassified reports from Brookhaven National Laboratoty/NRC/DOE, and his VERY NEGATIVE technical opinion about ANY/ALL "fault tree analysis", which the NRC/DOE and (God help us!!!) variois Federal Anti-Terrorism/Counter-Intelligence agencies are or might be foolish enough to believe in, quoting him about generic endemic "Fault Tree Analyses" in general: "wishful thinking, at best, based upon the Achilles Heel of long-tailed distributions, resulting in pure overparametrized fantasy".

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Date: March 5th, 2002

http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/artikkel?Avis=TO&Dato=20020305&Kategori=NEWS17&Lopenr=103050046&Ref=AR

Tests spot 5 defects in safety devices at Davis-Besse

Davis-Besse flaws on repair schedule

By TOM HENRY

BLADE STAFF WRITER

OAK HARBOR - Five of 69 primary safety devices used to help control FirstEnergy Corp.’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant have been operating with cracks in them, possibly for years.

The flaws, discovered by ultrasonic tests, caught the utility by surprise yesterday. The latest round of visual inspections only days ago revealed no problems, and neither did visual inspections during refueling outages every two years since at least 1996, Richard Wilkins, FirstEnergy spokesman, said.

Barring any complications, the defects will be repaired during the plant’s biennial refueling and maintenance outage, which began in mid-February and is to conclude at the end of this month. The additional cost was not known, he said.

The danger of ignoring repairs isn’t so much a radiation leak as it is compromising the integrity of devices that are essential to helping control-room operators shut down the plant in the event of an emergency.

The plant is along Lake Erie in rural Ottawa County, about 25 miles east of Toledo.

A company report on the matter is expected to be completed today or tomorrow. Among the first to be notified will be officials at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s headquarters in Washington and its Midwest regional office in Lisle, Ill.

Regulators from that agency last year expressed concerns about Davis-Besse and a dozen other nuclear plants that have pressurized water reactors, because a similar plant in South Carolina was found to have circumference-type cracks in devices known as control rod drive mechanism nozzles. Those nozzles are long, vertical tubes in the reactor head that serve as passageways for rods that control-room operators use to absorb excess neutrons in the reactor core, thereby keeping the plant running as it should.

Plants can operate safely if the metal tubes get a tiny vertical crack. The NRC’s anxiety grew because it had not previously seen nozzles crack in a circular manner, leading regulators to envision scenarios in which the metal could further weaken.

During the first week of December, the NRC considered issuing FirstEnergy a rare government order to shut down Davis-Besse for an emergency inspection - something that hasn’t been done anywhere in the country since 1987.

The agency backed off, largely because FirstEnergy offered to move up its refueling and maintenance outage about six weeks ahead of schedule.

The ultrasonic tests were the first on Davis-Besse’s reactor nozzles in the plant’s 25-year history.

Preliminary results that came back from a laboratory yesterday showed three nozzles with defects that warrant immediate repairs. Another two nozzles had cracks so tiny they could be inconsequential from a safety standpoint. But the utility will repair all five, Mr. Wilkins said.

None of the nozzles shows evidence of the dangerous, circumference-type crack that worried the NRC, though one "looks like it was starting to go around," he said.

Cracks can take years to develop, Mr. Wilkins said.

NRC officials were not available for comment last night.

Detroit Edison Co.’s Fermi II nuclear plant in northern Monroe County was not identified last year as being susceptible to nozzle cracks, because it has a different type of reactor. It has a boiling-water reactor.

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Date: March 6th, 2002

http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/artikkel?Avis=TO&Dato=20020306&Kategori=NEWS17&Lopenr=103060051&Ref=AR

No leaks found in Davis-Besse’s cracked nozzles

By TOM HENRY

BLADE STAFF WRITER

OAK HARBOR - None of the five cracked nozzles on top of FirstEnergy Corp.’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant reactor appears to have leaked.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed yesterday there was no salt-like buildup of boric acid on the exterior of metal tubes known as control rod drive mechanism nozzles, a sign that the cracks were confined to the interior of the devices.

It’s also a sign that the utility was able to head off the problem before it could have evolved into a greater safety risk, Jan Strasma, NRC spokesman, said.

Davis-Besse and other nuclear plants with pressurized water reactors have 69 such nozzles penetrating their reactor vessel heads.

The nozzles - essentially metal tubes - are considered part of the primary safety system because they help control-room operators plunge neutron-absorbing rods up and down the reactor core. That keeps the plant running as it should.

Nozzle cracks are not uncommon and typically take years to develop. They need to be fixed, though, so that they don’t create more obstacles if there’s a need for an emergency shutdown, Mr. Strasma explained.

The cracks were diagnosed by a series of ultrasonic tests - the first in the plant’s 25-year history. The fact they were confined to the interior of the nozzles helps explain why they went undetected in visual inspections during refueling outages every two years since 1996, the latest of which was completed in late February. Those inspections cover only the exterior of the nozzles, he said.

FirstEnergy has impressed regulators by not only making plans to fix the cracked nozzles - but with its plans to install a new reactor head during the plant’s next refueling outage in 2004, complete with 69 new nozzles.

The project will be enormous: Dome-shaped vessel heads are 14 feet wide and made of solid steel, some four feet thick in the middle.

FirstEnergy declined to provide cost estimates for that project, as well as its latest round of repairs.

New vessel heads cost on the order of $15 million to $20 million - approximately $5 million to $8 million to build, plus another $10 million to $12 million for expenses such as design and installation, according to Melanie Lyons, spokeswoman for the nuclear industry’s Washington-based trade group, the Nuclear Energy Institute.

The utility will be the first in the NRC’s seven-state Midwest region to bring in a whole new vessel head, according Mr. Strasma, who described it as a "prudent move on their part."

The utility wants to start fresh with a new reactor cover to avoid more expensive repairs when the plant gets older and more nozzles become susceptible to cracks. "That’s certainly one of the factors and a strong one," Richard Wilkins, FirstEnergy spokesman, said.

Another is the company’s hope that Davis-Besse has more years left in it, he said. The plant’s 40-year license expires in 2017, but company officials notified the government several months ago that they intend to seek a 10-year extension.

Mr. Wilkins said that the plant always will need various parts replaced but that it has been running in good shape: It set an internal record of 639 days - nearly two years - of continuous operation until shutting down for refueling Feb. 16.

"The only way you can do that is to have confidence in the equipment you have," Mr. Wilkins said.

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Date: March 7th, 2002

http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/artikkel?SearchID=73093173884234&Avis=TO&Dato=20020307&Kategori=NEWS17&Lopenr=103070087&Ref=AR

Davis-Bess

e, Fermi II pass safety evaluations

The Toledo area’s two nuclear plants received passing marks in their latest government evaluations.

FirstEnergy Corp.’s Davis-Besse plant in Ottawa County and Detroit Edison Co.’s Fermi II plant in Monroe County were notified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission this week that they "operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and fully met all cornerstone objectives."

Letters acknowledging the results were posted on the government agency’s Internet web site yesterday. Both plants are about 25 miles from Toledo.

A public meeting is set for April 3 at the Davis-Besse administration building to discuss that plant’s results. No meeting is scheduled to discuss Fermi’s results.